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Law as a Tool of Social Engineering: The Case of 
the Republic of South Africa 
by Lee W. Potts 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa, the National Party came to power m 1948. 1 The l\: ational 
Party's electoral campaign platform consisted of little more than a single word: 
apartheid. But they advanced no precise definition of the word. Literally, apart-
heid meant apartness; but racial segregation was already the hallmark of South 
African society.2 White domination of the social, political and economic life of 
Dr. Lee W. Potts, B.A., San Jose State University; M.A., San Jose State University; Ph.D., University 
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of Mississippi. 
\. Boer War generalJ.B.M. Herzog founded the National Party in 1913. Its formation, by Afrikaners 
for the protection of Afrikaner interests, is best explained in the context of the white race's history in 
South Africa. White settlements in South Africa date back to the mid-seventeenth century, when the 
Dutch East India Company was in need of a refreshment station for vessels engaged in trade with the 
Far East. Hence, the Dutch sent a contingent of Dutch farmers and their families to settle the Cape of 
Good Hope. Subsequently. their numbers increased through additional immigration hy French, Ger-
man and Scandinavian citizens, most of whom assimilated with the dominant Dutch stock. 
By the close of the seventeenth century, the Afrikaners' reliance upon slaves as a source of labor 
became a major factor in their successful economic buildup of the area. However, in the earlv part of 
the nineteenth century, the British abolished the slave trade in the British Empire and extended this 
policy to Cape Colony. During the following years, the Afrikaners pushed into the interior wilderness, 
clashing with black Africans along the way and establishing two republics. 
Although the British recognized the new Afrikaner republics for a time, the discovery of massive 
diamond and gold deposits on their land in 1867 shattered their treasured isolation. This discovery 
increased British interest in controlling South Africa, resulting, at century's end, in a concurrent 
guerrilla war against the British by the Afrikaners: the Boer War. 
It took the better-equipped, better-trained and more numerous British troops two years to defeat the 
Boers, or Afrikaners. The British ridiculed the Afrikaners, after a humiliating and destructive skirmish, 
for their poverty, country ways and language. The British denied them jobs and instead employed black 
Africans who were willing to work more cheaply. Thus, Herzog formed the National Party to restore 
Afrikaners to their former place in South African society. 
Different elements of the National Party practiced varying degrees of cooperation with their non-
Afrikaner countrymen. However, a political pact made between that party and the English-speaking 
Labour Party resulted in objections by many Afrikaners and thus the formation of the "Purified 
National Party"; that is, purified of non-Afrikaner elements. It was that party which came to power in 
1948. See generally J. HOAGLANn, SOUTH AFRICA: CIVILIZATIO"S I" CO"FLICT (1972); B. SACKS, SOUTH 
AFRICA: AN IMPERIAL DILEMMA (1967) [hereinaher cited as SACKS]; H. STRYDOM & 1. WILKI"S, THE 
BROEDERBOND (1979) [hereinafter cited as STRYDOM & WILKINSl; A. VA"DENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA AND 
THE WORLD (1970) [hereinafter cited as VANDENBOSCH]. 
2. D.F. Malan, founder of the Purified National Party first used the term apartheid in the South 
African Parliament on June 24, 1944. He spoke of a policy "to ensure the safelY of the white race and of 
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the country was firmly established and was not in danger of dissolution, irrespec-
tive of which party was in power.3 Thus, apartheid had to mean more than either 
segregation or white domination (baasskap).4 
The message of the apartheid platform was clear to the Afrikaner segment of 
white society. After a century-and-a-half of British rule, the descendants of the 
original Dutch and French Hugenot settlers of South Africa had regained 
control of their country. They had overcome the British liberalism which had 
interfered with the order of society. The white man intended to reestablish the 
primacy of his traditional social values and to reassume unequivocal domination 
over his racially and culturally inferior countrymen. 5 
This article examines the process by which the National Party regime has used 
law as a tool of social engineering to achieve these goals. The author discusses the 
process by which the National Party has adapted the legal system to the demands 
of the apartheid ideal and by which the legal system contributes to realization of 
Afrikaner social ideals. The major premise of the article is that the legal system 
Christian civilization by the honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and guardianship." G.W. 
SHEPERD, ANTI-ApARTHEID 3 (1977). 
Apartheid is an Afrikaans term meaning "apartness" or "segregation." Apartheid is a system of racial 
discrimination Lreated, maintained, and intended to be perpetuated by government design. Feimpong 
& Treivel, Can Apartheid Successfullv Defy the International Legal System?, 5 BLACK L.J. 287 (1977). 
Apartheid is composed of both a slavery and a caste system, persons being identified by birth and 
parentage. M. McDoCGAL, HFMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PCBLlC ORDER 521-22 (1980). 
The polin of apartheid has two aspects, "little" or "petty," and "big" apartheid. The former refers to 
social segregation and the denial of most ordinary civil and political rights to non-Europeans. The latter 
encompasses territorial segregation of the races. "As the South African whites see it, any policy other 
than segregation would lead to t heir political and ultimate biogenetic extinction, either by force or 
assimilation." VA:-.JDENBOSCH, supra note 1, at 24-25. See aLw l\..f. BALLINGER, FROM UNION TO APARTHEID 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as BAl.LINGER]; Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation I: Fundamental 
Structure, 71 YALE L..J. 1 (1961). 
3. For the history and background of white domination in South Africa, see generall)l BALul\'GER, supra 
note 2; SACKS, supra note 1. 
4. The term haas.,kap, usually defined literally as "supremacv," can connote any of a number of 
political positions with regard to the relationship between the "superior" white and "inferior" other 
races in South Africa. See generally BALLINGER, supra note 2, at 334. For example, J.G. Strydom, D.F. 
Malan's successor to the office of South African Prime Minister, advo<:ated "master and servant 
haas.lkap" in the 1948 general election campaign.Id. at 318. In the more "liberal" view, some members of 
the dominant white class advocate separate areas of domicile for the races: 
My view is this: all these areas Lan become self-governing, and in this sense they can have 
haasskap (supremacy) over their own fate: but all these areas will be within the geographic and 
economic unit of the Union of South Africa and dependant on it. Also in respect of any 
international relations concerning the defence of this country. It speaks for itself that South 
Africa is the trustee and the ruler of the whole. We have always said that the white man must 
rule in South Africa, but the National Party favours local self~government for the Native in his 
mvn areas. 
Id. at 319-20. 
5. See note 1 supra, for a general background of white domination in South Africa. This domination 
has extended to all non-white races, including both indigenous tribes and slaves imported from 
Malaysia as prisoners to expiate acts of crime. "On the one hand, an expansion of the white communities 
created a demand for more labor; on the other, the decimation of the indigenous people as a result of 
war and smallpox reduced the available supply." SACKS, supra note 1, at 1-3. 
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fosters a set of behavioral norms which tightly structure interracial contacts and 
which lead to the acquiescence of a large portion of the non-white population in 
its own subjugation. The ultimate result of such behavioral norms is the per-
petuation of a system of gross racial inequality. Yet, at the same time, these 
norms also facilitate the effective management of the tension engendered by the 
inequality. 
II. THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
A. A Challenge to the Traditional Perspective 
The concept of law as a tool of social engineering has not been explicitly 
addressed by public policy makers in South Africa. Nevertheless, a study of the 
National Party's program of restructuring society while formally maintaining 
fealty to the rule of law demonstrates the potential for conscious use of law as a 
vehicle of directed social change. Although the Republic of South Africa is not 
unique in using law either for social engineering or as an element in enforcing 
racial stratification, the South African case is notable because it both challenges 
and affirms various scholarly perspectives of the linkages between law and social 
change. This case also provides insight into the factors which contribute to the 
efficacy of law as a tool of social engineering. Further, the South African case is 
illuminating because of its scope and because of the coherence of the social 
engineering focus of Nationalist legal policy. 
The idea that law can be used to secure a self-reinforcing system of racial 
subjugation of the majority of the population directly challenges the traditional 
anthropological perspective of law and society. According to the traditional 
perspective, law is a dependent variable in the nexus of social processes.6 Law, in 
other words, emerges as a product of other social processes. Anthropologists, 
such as Malinowski and Sumner, as well as the pioneering sociologist Durkheim, 
have maintained that law represents the authoritative distillation of community 
consensus on both the need and the acceptable procedures for conflict resolu-
tion. 7 They saw the primary service of law as being a mechanism for preserving 
cQmmunity integrity in the face of differences arising over both conflicting 
interpretations of proper and improper conduct and individual incidents of 
purposeful norm violation. 8 In their view, in either type of conflict, the social 
norm precedes and legitimizes the legal strictures or procedures.9 In general, 
6. W. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 3, 56-57 (1906) [hereinafter cited as SUMNER]. 
7. B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926) [hereinafter cited as MALINOWSKI]; 
SUMNER, supra note 6; E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893) [hereinafter cited as 
DURKHEIM]. 
8. SUMNER, supra note 6, at 64-66; E. HOEBEL, THE LAw OF PRIMITIVE MAN 15 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as HOE BEL]. 
9. SUMNER, supra note 6, at 53-57; HOE BEL, supra note 8, at 15-17. 
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under the traditional perspective on law and society "the law derives its working 
principles from postulates previously developed in the non-legal spheres of 
action."!O Accordingly, legal change follows, but does not initiate, social change. 
The apartheid program directly challenged this perspective because it envisions 
law as a molder of norms and as a catalyst for social change. 
Insohlr as the Nationalists accept the potential utility of law as a tool of social 
engineering, they are within the mainstream of contemporary socio-Iegal think-
ing. Scholars of law and social change now generally assert that legal change and 
social change may flow in either direction.!! They recognize that social change 
produces changes in substantive law, legal institutions and legal processes, and 
that law can be an agent of directed social change.!2 The Nationalists are also in 
line with public policy makers in other countries.!3 The rise of the welfare state 
in the West, the establishment of socialism in the East and the emphasis on 
development politics in much of the Third World indicate that public policy in 
almost every contemporary society tacitly upholds the legitimacy and efficacy of 
social engineering. 
The general acceptance of the fact that law can be used to shape social 
processes does not necessarily indicate the existence of firm bases for acceptance. 
The precise contribution of law to programmed social change is not easily 
discernible. An examination of the South African experience contributes to the 
study of law and society by illustrating the factors which facilitate successful use 
of the law as a tool of social engineering. 
B. The E7'iriena of Law as a Tool of Social Engineering 
Western scholars generally agree that law can be used to direct social change. 
But the initial question is one of evidence. One major work presents 115 essays, 
comprising 1019 pages of text, on "[t]he ways in which the legal system affects 
society and in which society affects the legal system."!4 The authors admitted 
that "there are no classic answers [sic] or even serious attempts at [an answer]," to 
the classic question of the limits on the effectiveness of law, which they equate 
with the question of the impact oflaw on society.!5 Similarly, another widely read 
10. HOEBEL, supra note 8, at 276. 
II. See generally V. AUBERT. SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1969); Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TUL. L. REV. 
787,794 (1959) [hereinafier cited as Drorl; LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (S. Nagel ed. 1970); Zimring & 
Hawkins. The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social Change, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
SOCIETY 60 U. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977) [hereinafier cited as Tapp & Levine]. 
12. Drar, supra note II, at 797. Law shapes social institutions such as education, which indirectly 
effects social change. Id. 
13. See, e.g., Dror, supra note II, at 796 & n. 25. In Russia, Soviet jurists use law to bring about social 
change. Id. 
14. L. FRIEDMA>I & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
FRIEDMAN & MACAt:LAyJ. 
15. Id. at viii. 
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work presents 25 essays and excerpts of court decisions, comprising 204 pages of 
text, on the capacity of the law to affect social behavior. Hi They were unable to 
show directly intended social effects of legal change. 17 More recently, an entire 
issue of Law and Society Review presented European studies in law and society.IH 
These essays covered bankruptcy law in Germany,19 family law in Italy and 
Belgium,20 drug law in Germany and the Netherlands,21 and statutes prescribing 
worker participation in management in Poland. 22 The editor pointed out that 
the articles disclosed the inefficacy of law as a tool of social engineering.2:1 
The evidence brings into question the usefulness of the general assumption of 
most modern legal sociologists that law "influences other parts of the social 
system."2. The basic sociological definition of "social system," that various parts 
of the social system influence various other parts, underlies this assumption.25 
Before law can be considered a viable mechanism of directed social change, the 
effects of law on such change must be demonstrated. The studies in the West do 
not make this demonstration. Although the law and development movement 
sought to facilitate modernization in the late developing countries by importing 
western legal codes and principles, that movement has virtually faded away.26 
Even the peoples' democracies have not demonstrated that law is a viable tool 
of directed social change. In Russia, the Soviet regime attempted to alter Muslim 
culture in South-Central Asia by using law designed for programmed social 
change. 27 However, the primary tools of large-scale societal change were terror 
and extermination.2H The Russian answer to non-conformance norms among 
16. R. SCHWARTZ & J. SKOLNICK, SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER (1970). 
17. Id. at 425-29. 
18. Special Issue on European Socwlogy of Law, 12 LAW & SOC'y REv. 487 (1978). 
19. Gessner, Rhode, Strate & Ziegart, Three Functwns of Bankruptcy Law, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 499 
(1978). 
20. Pocar & Ronfani, Family Law in Italy, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 607 (1978); Houtte & Breda, Financial 
Support of the Aged by Their Adult Children, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 645 (1978). 
21. Scheerer, The New Dutch and German Drug Laws, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 585 (1978). 
22. Ozdowski & AleXander, The Legal Order and Industrial Workers in a Communist Enterprise, 12 LAW & 
SOC'Y REv. 545 (1978). 
23. Abel, From the Editor, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 489, 491 (1978). 
24. FRIEDMAN & MACAULAY, supra note 14, at 197. 
25. For example, Max Weber notes that social action "takes account of the behavior of others and is 
thereby oriented in its course." M. WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL ANn ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 88 (1947). 
See also 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 470-73 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). 
26. See Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the 
Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMPo L. 457, 479-81 (1977), for a discussion of the rise and 
decline of the law and development movement. See also Beckstrom, Handicaps of Legal Social Engineering 
in a Developing Natwn, 22 AM. J. COMPo L. 697 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Beckstrom], for an account of 
the elaborate, but ill-fated, law and development effort in Ethiopia where legal codes were drawn from 
the best of European legal codes in order to create a modern Ethiopia. The framers deemed customary 
law to be inappropriate. !d. at 700. 
27. See generally Massell, Law as an Instrument of Revolutwnary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of 
Soviet Central Asia, 2 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 179 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Massell]. 
28. L. GERSON, THE SECRET POLICE IN LENIN'S RUSSIA 4-8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GERSON]. The 
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Kulaks,29 and the Chinese answer to non-conformance norms among land-
lords,:]O was elimination of the non-conforming groups en masse. While the South 
Africans have been accused of manipulation of the legal process to deal with 
opponents of the regime, they have relied primarily on law to shape norms and 
behaviors so that potential opponents are induced to acquiesce in the system. 
The primary approach to law as a tool of social engineering in the peoples' 
democracies has been much closer to the traditional law-as-dependant-variable 
orientation.:ll These legal systems view man as malleable and as subject to 
attitudinal change through social conditioning.32 But this view came into being 
only after the governments had destroyed the irreconcilable enemies of the 
people. In China, for example, during the early years of the Communist regime, 
1949- I 953, mass trials by ad hoc tribunals functioned, without any standardized 
charges or procedures, "to wipe out reactionaries and intimidate the potentially 
undesirable."33 Only after the most threatening enemies of the people had been 
purged from the law enforcement system did efforts turn to development of 
regular courts and standardized procedures34 such as those under the judicial 
reform movement in 195235 and the Constitution of 1954.36 Once purged of its 
enemies the Chinese government focused on specific transgressions by individ-
uals who were in essential agreement with the regime. The regime's legal system 
was primarily concerned with adjustment of individual situations rather than 
Soviets created the secret police less than a month-and-a-half after the October Revolution of 1917. "It 
did not judge the foes of the regime, it destroyed them." Id. at 3. Lenin foresaw the transition from 
capitalism to communism as an inevitable period of unprecedented class struggle. Id. at 5. See F. BECK & 
W. GODIN, RUSSIAN PURGE AND THE EXTRACTION OF CONFESSION (1951) [hereinafter cited as BECK & 
GODIN]; C. FRIEDRICH & Z. BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOGRACY 172-79 (2d ed. 
1965). 
29. See GERSON, supra note 28, at 83-85. Kulaks were the small minority of rich peasants in Russia. 
The Soviets blamed the peasant uprisings during the early years of Lenin's regimes on the cunning 
promises, slander and threats of the Kulaks which were said to have incited the ordinary Russian 
peasant to revolt. The policy of the secret police was to eliminate the leaders and Kulaks, but not to 
harm the peasants who had been fooled or intimidated by them. Id. The collectivization of millions of 
peasant holdings was accompanied by liquidation of the Kulaks who refused or hesitated to enter the 
collective economy. Liquidation included arrest and deportation to Siberia. BECK & GODIN, supra note 
28, at 15. 
30. See, e.g., Tao, Politics and Law Enforcement in China: 1949-1970, 22 AM. J. COMPo L. 713, 715, 
720-29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tao]. 
31. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. 
32. See notes 34 & 39 infra. See, e.g., Tao, supra note 30, at 720-29. The Chinese used mass trials to 
solidify the masses by awakening a political consciousness and rallying support for the regime. Berman, 
The Use of Law to Guide People to Virtue, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 77 U. Tapp & 
F. Levine eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Berman]. 
33. Tao, supra note 30, at 717. 
34. See generally id. at 720-29. 
35. See New China News Agency, Reform of Judicial Work Under Planning by All Judicial Organs 
(Aug. 17,1952), translated in AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, HONG KONG, SURVEY OF CHINA MAINLAND 
PRESS No. 302, 8 (1952). 
36. PEOPLE'S REp. OF CHINA CONST. (1954), translated in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COM-
MUNIST CHINA I (A. Blaustein ed. 1962). 
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broad social engineering.:lI This is similar to the approach of western legal 
systems. 
In a discussion of "vospitatel'naia rol' sovetskogo prava" (the nurturing role of 
Soviet law),3H one authority asserts that the Soviet legal system rejects the use of 
law as a tool of coercion. Instead, he claims that the Soviet system focuses on 
educating, guiding and training citizens with officially prescribed moral princi-
ples, social values and legal tenets. 39 This approach to legal processes is directed 
at attitudinal and behavioral change, which are aspects of social change.'o Never-
theless, the Soviet state recognizes the desirability, if not the necessity, of adapt-
ing officially promulgated law rather than allowing basic values and intuitive 
concepts of justice to shape the social system.41 
In its nurturing role, a legal system will apply sanctions to a violator of certain 
prescribed norms. The system aims to persuade the violator of the official 
wrongfulness of his actions and to induce him not to repeat these actions. At the 
same time, this approach demonstrates to others that official procedures are 
consonant with unofficial perceptions of justiceY The Soviet experience implies 
that, although law may in fact be an instrument of social change, only incremen-
tal change is produced. Large-scale social change takes place through overt 
exercise of political power. 43 Accordingly, the legal process is effective in social 
engineering only when the legal processes are accepted by the citizenry because 
these processes are compatible with preexisting concepts of justice. 44 
C. The Factors Which Contribute to Successful Use of Law in Social Engineering 
In general, scholars have not effectively evaluated the factors which account 
for successful use of law as a tool of social engineering. Systematic knowledge of 
how to use law to achieve social goals and of the practical state of the art in so 
doing "approximate zero."45 Examination of the South African experience dem-
onstrates that the effective use of law in social engineering is a legitimate idea. 
Most other studies have attempted to relate social factors to causative legal 
change.'6 The author, in studying the South African experience, focuses instead 
37. See, e.g., Pepinsky, Reliance on Formal Written Law and Freedom and Social Control in the United States 
and the People's Republic of China, 26 BRIT. J. Soc. 330 (1975). 
38. Berman, supra note 32, at 76-77. 
39. [d. 
40. Id. at 81-83. 
41. !d. at 76. Intuitive concepts of justice are essentially the moral sentiments and sense of justice of 
the citizenry . [d. 
42. [d. at 84. 
43. See Massel. supra note 27. 
44. Berman, supra note 32, at 76. 
45. Dror, Law as a Tool of Directed Social Change, in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 75 (S. Nagel ed. 1970) 
[hereinafter cited as Dror, Law as a Tool]. 
46. See Aubert, Some Social Functions of Legislation, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 98 (1966); Dror, supra note 
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on the process through which the National regime has adapted the legal system 
to its ideological premises and has then used the legal system to control the 
normative basis of the society. The resulting control has been far more pervasive 
than that which would follow from any individual legal enactment. 
This examination is based on the theory that law should be viewed as a 
commonplace phenomenon that categorizes experiences and establishes a mean-
ingful structure for social action. 47 Analytically, a "meaningful structure" exists 
prior to specific actions, although the structure may be recognized only by 
patterns of social action."'" From a heuristic perspective, an examination of the 
nexus between law and society must treat legal propositions as both created and 
creative. Thus for the purpose of this article, meaningful social action must be 
explained in respect to legal phenomena.49 This approach is not intended to 
answer questions about the nature of law.") It is designed to examine how 
meaningful legal systems arise and what societal consequences result from such 
systems.;;1 
This study demonstrates the success of using law as a tool of social engineering 
in South Africa. This success emanates from se\'eral factors which together 
constitute the infrastructure of social engineering and create meaningful struc-
ture on social action. These factors are: (1) the existence of a relatively coherent 
view of the idealnormati\'e basis of social action; (2) a legal culture that facilitates 
the imposition of the social engineering program; and (3) the specific elements 
01 the social engineering program itself. 
III. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
A. Ajiikan Sorial IdeaL\ 
A political program to order and control social processes cannot be successful 
if it is devised without reference to pre-existing conditions. The basic values of 
the society have an impact on the potential effectiveness of legal social engineer-
ing. Belore legal sanctions can have an effect on social norms a compatible 
cultural f<llllldation must exist upon which to build the body oflegal prescription 
and proscription. Many attempts to effect social change through legal sanction 
ha\'e lailed because policymakers did not recognize that legal social engineering 
requires two phases: the pre-engagement phase and the working phase. 52 Only 
II; Gorecki, Divorce in Poland: A Sociological Study, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 68 (1968); see also notes 18-23 
)upra. 
47. Grace & Wilkinson, Social Action and a Methodology for the Socwlogy of Law, I BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 185, 
IH9 (1974). 
4H. ld. 
49. ld. at 190. 
50. ld. 
51. ld. 
52. Beckstrom, supra note 26, at 699. 
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when the two phases are synchronous and mutually reinforcing can law actually 
control social processes. 
In South Africa, the requisite infrastructure was fairly well established. The 
Afrikaner53 had a coherent image of the proper configuration of South African 
society. The image was based in part on history, in part on historical myth, and in 
part on a vision of natural social order. The Afrikaner desired to recapture the 
Golden Age of 1652 to 1806.54 During that period, the social order was clear and 
was in conformance with Calvinistic natural law.55 
In the retrospective Afrikaner view of the Golden Age, the white man was the 
undisputed lord and master over the indigenous Cape people56 as well as over 
the imported African and Malay slaves. Interracial contact was mostly limited to 
paternalistic master-servant relationships. Society expected the white master to 
reign as a benign despot over his black and brown servants.57 He was to provide 
53. Approximately sixty per cent of the dominant white population in South Africa claims to be 
essentially African, both culturally and emotionally: 
This is a claim reHected in the name which it has assumed for itself, that of Afrikaner, and for 
the language which it speaks, Afrikaans. However, even as Afrikanerdom claims to be a 
product of Africa, and has resented the use of the word African to denote the black population 
group in the country, it claims also to be the torch-bearer of Western Christian Civilisation on 
the continent of Africa. Diverse in origin, Hollanders, refugee French Huguenots, and Ger-
mans seeking a livelihood and adventure in the service of the great Dutch East India Company 
which founded the first settlement at the Cape in the mid-seventeenth century, in the isolation 
of the days of slow travel and communication and over the wide spaces of this sparsely 
populated land, these early settlers did in fact develop a character and a culture of their own, 
and a language to express them. This, uncler various influences and at various times, has 
encouraged a sense of separateness from all the other groups that has been of profound 
political significance. 
BALLINGER, supra note 2, at 16. 
54. White domination was at its "best" in South Ah'ica during the period from 1652, when white 
settlers established Capetown, until the early 1800's, after which time the British abolished the slave 
trade in the British Empire and extended this policy to Capetown. See SACKS, supra note 1: STRYDOM & 
WILKINS, supra note 1; VANDENBOSCH, supra note I. 
55. P. VAN DE" BERGHE, SOUTH AFRICA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 14-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VAN 
DEN BERGHE]' 
56. The two primary indigenous tribes enwuntered by the first white settlers of South Africa were 
the Bushmen, "a pigmy race of aboriginals" and the Hottentots. SACKS, supra note 1, at 1-2. The former 
group were nomads, seeming to the naive whites to be "utterly devoid of human sensibilities." !d. at 1. 
The Bushmen regarded the cattle of the Europeans as fair game and, with their poisoned arrows, made 
life precarious for the white settlers. The Boer policy toward the Bushmen was one of extermination, 
driving the latter deep into neighboring mountains and beyond into desert country. !d. The Hottentots 
were taller in stature and seemingly more culturally advanced than the Bushmen. They forged 
implements of copper and tended domesticated cattle and sheep. They too preyed upon the white 
settlements but fell easy victims to the Boers and their superior arms: 
The bHe of the Hottentots was not extermination for, unlike the Bushmen, they submitted 
quickly to white domination. Left to shift for themselves, the Hottentots became detribalized 
hangers-on, bartering away their cattle for beads, tobacco, and liquor. The Boers reduced 
them to humble dependency, exploiting their labor to the point of servitude and describing 
them contemptuously as "dull, stupid, lazy, and stinking." 
Id. at 2. 
57. Take it all round, slavery at the Cape was not cruel. In Capetown, skilled slaves were allowed 
to hire themselves out in their spare time and thus earn money with which to buy a substitute 
and win their own freedom. There was, of course, the crop of crime which always flourishes on 
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basic sustenance and support, including moral education, in return for dutiful 
service. If the service was inadequate or if the servant breached social etiquette, 
the social system expected the master to exact swift and, if necessary, harsh 
punishment. The servant had only the right to labor for the master.58 
The master-servant relationship clearly did not rest on physical segregation of 
the races. White and non-white lived in close proximity.59 Well ordered racial 
integration was the mode of interracial interaction. Integration was premised on 
entrenched white hegemony.6o The key to maintenance of the social order was 
the pattern of internalized behavioral norms which guided interracial contact. 
From the Nationalist's perspective, these behavioral norms functioned to in-
stitutionalize various social obligations.61 
Thus, according to the Nationalist view, In the Golden Age the system ex-
pected all black people to accept the superiority of all white people in all 
situations. Moreover, all white people accepted the inferiority of all black people 
in all situations. In every instance of interracial contact, individuals had to 
dismiss personal interests and inclinations. Social status and role positions were 
based solely on racial group membership.62 Each individual related to each other 
servile soil; there were the usual escapes. sometimes of groups of men who obtained arms, 
pillaged outlying farms, and had to be hunted down by commandos; sometimes there was 
trouble with the Hottentot clans for harbouring runaways. Slave law, the product of fear, was 
harsh even by the fierce seventeenth century standards; the whip, chains, branding and the loss 
of ears were the penalties for such crimes as stealing cabbages from a garden; murderers and 
rapers were either broken at the wheel or hanged as high as Haman; the High Court did not 
shrink from torturing slaves if necessary. On the other hand, though [the High Commissioner] 
permitted owners to administer 'moderate punishment: that is, an ordinary beating at discre-
tion. he forbade them to trice up a slave and flog him without permission of the Fiscal or 
Governor; burghers were punished for ill-using slaves. and the Company ordered the public 
sale of a slave who had accused his master of crime as the best means of saving him from 
domestic vengeance. 
E. WALKER, A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 71 (3d. ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WALKER]. 
58. A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 17-20 (1973). 
59. The passage of the Land Act of 1913 marked the beginning of the territorial separation of 
Africans from whites in South Africa. VANDENBOSCH. supra note 1. at 25. Until that time. apartheid was 
practiced as a means of social segregation through the denial of ordinary civil and political rights to 
non-Europeans. /d. at 24-25. 
60. "Hegemony" usually describes leadership status or dominance in relations between sovereign 
states. Inequalities in economic strength, military power and size induce nations to form hegemonial 
alignments within the international community. See generally 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TtoNAL LAW 146 (1974). Hegemony is a counterposition to equality. It is held by a major power or 
central executive which maintains preeminence and influence over one or more weaker states, or in this 
case. people. Id. at 144-45. 
61. J. MARAIS, THE CAPE COLOURED PEOPLE. 1652-1937. at 162-72 (1939). 
62. One author has distinguished three types of racial segregation that have occurred in South Africa 
since the infusion of whites in the mid-seventeenth century. At first, the ruling white class stressed 
"micro-segregation." or the segregation in public and private facilities (such as waiting rooms, railway 
carriages, post office counters and washrooms) located in areas inhabited by members of several racial 
groups. Van den Berghe, Racial Segregation in South Africa: Degrees and Kinds. in SOUTH AFRICA: 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 37 (H. Adam ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Degrees and Kinds]. During the 
nineteenth century, a shift towards "meso-segregation," or the maintenance of racial ghettos occurred. 
This arose "as a way of making the non-white helotry as invisible as possible to [the whites]. and of 
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individual on generalized terms that applied to all members of respective 
groupS.63 
From the perspective of the Nationalists when they came to power in 1948,64 
the pre-British Cape society was a stable racial oligarchy in which the non-whites 
accepted their station without question. In reality, however, such a rigid system 
of formalized interpersonal contact never existed.65 Complete unequivocal ac-
ceptance of inferior status did not exist either. Still, the historical myth of the 
Golden Age provided the ideological basis for the apartheid program. The 
Nationalists did not base the apartheid program on simple subjugation of the 
non-whites. Rather, the objective of the new regime was to reestablish a self-per-
petuating social order characterized by domination by whites and passive coop-
eration of the non-whites.66 This program involved the use of public power to 
create the proper environment in which to re-assert the old internalized norms. 
B. ThR Legal Culture 
The law became an integral factor in effecting desired social change because of 
the pre-existing South African legal culture. The Nationalists could look back 
over a century-and-a-half of British domination and see the steady erosion of the 
foundations of the natural social order. 67 But when the Nationalists looked back, 
they responded to rather superficial indications of change. 
The foundation tor social engineering law existed before 1948. More impor-
tantly, the pre-1948 legal culture provided legitimization for the introduction of 
the many laws unknown to either English common law or Roman-Dutch law. 
preserving the latter from the moral and physical contamination of congested. unhygienic slums." /d. at 
39. Finally, the ruling whites shifted towards "macro-segregation," or the segregation of racial groups 
into discrete territorial units. [d. at 37. 
Van den Berghe has explained this shift from micro- to macro-segregation, although the former 
form of segregation is still strongly maintained, as follows: 
There are two apparent reasons why the South African government has increasingly stressed 
macro-segregation. First, if one accepts the Government's premises that interracial contact 
promotes conflict and that Apartheid is the only salvation for the albinocracy, then it follows 
that maximization of physical distance between racial groups is desirable. Second, macro-
segregation. . can be presented. for purposes of international apologetics, as an attempt at 
equitable partition between separate but equal nations within a happy commonwealth. Indeed, 
a favourite argument of the apostles of Apartheid is that their policy substitutes vertical, 
non-hierarchical barriers between ethnic groups for a horizontal, discriminatory colour bar. 
[d. at 38. 
63. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 55. at 19-21. 
64. See note 1 supra. 
65. A. KEPPEL-JONES. SOUTH AFRICA 41-45 (1963). 
66. See § IV inFra. 
67. Strydom and Wilkins provide an insight into National Party feelings toward the Afrikaners' lot in 
life prior to that party's coming to power in 1948: "In the slums we are permitted, but in those parts 
which rightly belong to us admission is refused." STRYDOM & WILKINS, supra note I, at 101 (quoting a 
prominent Afrikaner named M.e. van Schoor). The time had come when the Afrikaners would no 
longer be strangers in the land that had been dearly bought with the blood of their ancestors. "While the 
Afrikaner is working with the pick and shovel. the stranger is occupying the offices." /d. 
12 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. V, No. I 
Although these two great traditions of European law provided the procedural 
and substantive bases for the South African legal system, the spirit of these laws 
had not penetrated deeply enough into basic values of the South African society 
to prevent the establishment of the apartheid legal system."" 
Both English common law and Roman-Dutch law promote equality of all 
persons. In these systems, the courts serve as protectors of personal rights.69 Yet, 
the role of equity, which is important in other countries with common law roots, 
had long been missing from the South African legal system. The willingness of 
the courts to uphold racial discrimination, as long as it conformed with written 
law, was a clearly marked feature of South African judicial decisions before the 
Nationalists came to power. 70 
In 1934, the Court of Appeal, in Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1'. Rasool'l 
upheld the Postmaster-General's decision to provide separate postal facilities for 
whites and non-whites. In so doing, the court overturned the lower Transvaal 
Provincial Division which had held that separation based on race or color was 
illicit discrimination.'2 The court decided by a three to one vote. The lone 
dissenter, Acting Judge of Appeal F.G. Gardiner, lamented that the court had 
rejected the "fundamental principle of our law that in the eyes of the law all men 
are equal.""! 
Gardiner's sentiment was, however, at odds with the reality of South Afi'ican 
law. He, himself, could offer only lower court decisions" as precedent for 
disallowing racial discrimination and conceded that the court was not bound by 
those precedents.'5 The other judges hearing the case,'6 upheld discrimination 
based on race for two different reasons. Acting Chief Justice Stratford and 
Judge de Villiers, felt that racially separate facilities and services were legal as 
68. For a discussion of the effect of the English common law and the Roman-Dutch law on the South 
African legal system, see Hahlo & Maisels, The Rule of Law in South Africa, .52 U. VA. L. REV. I, 12-15 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Hahlo & Maisels]; O. SCHREINER, THE CONTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH LAW TO 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 10-70 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SCHREINER]. Schreiner also dis('usses the failure 
of the Anglo-Dutch legal tradition to prevent the development of apartheid. Id. at 87-102. 
69. See Hahlo & Maisels, supra note 68, at 12-14. See also SCHREINER, supra note 68. 
70. See notes 16-28 and accompanying text infra. 
71. [1934] App. Div. 167. 
72. Id. at 172. 
73. [d. at 187 (Gardiner,]., dissenting). 
74. See Williams & Adendorff v. Johannesburg Municipality, [1915] Transvaal Provincial Div. 
[T.P.D.] 106 (holding, without considering the issue of equal treatment, that the government could not 
set apart separate trams for Europeans and non-Europeans on the basis of color distinction); Rex v. 
Plaatjes, [1910] Eastern District [E.D.L.] 63 (holding that the government could not make non-
European use of a European bathing area criminal on the basis of color only); Ebrahim v. Licensing 
Officer Pietermaritzburg, [1925] Natal Provincial Div. [N.P.D.] 222 (holding that a municipality could 
not refuse to issue an establishment a food and drink license on the grounds that the establishment 
intended to serve non-Europeans). 
75. Rasool, [1934] App. Div. at 192-93. 
76. The justices hearing the case were]. Stratford, A.C.]., E. deVilliers, F. Byers, and F. Gardiner. 
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long as they were essentially equal in quality.'7 For the fourth judge, Judge 
Beyers, the issue was much easier to settle. He found Gardiner's insistence that 
all people are equal in the eyes of the law (and implicitly, Stratford and de 
Villiers' "separate but equal" proviso) irrelevant. From his point of view, in the 
Transvaal, white and non-white had never been equal in the eyes of the law. 7H 
Rasool, in effect, highlights the salience of legal culture in socio-legal change. 
Gardiner had stressed that equality before the law was a fundamental principle 
of South African law. 79 But earlier in the same term, the court had articulated a 
conflicting fundamental principle of the administration of justice: "[P]arliament 
may make any encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty or property of any 
individual subject to its sway, and ... it is the function of courts of law to 
enforce its will."HO In Rasool, however, the Postmaster-General's action had not 
been based specifically on an Act of Parliament. s1 For this reason, the Transvaal 
Division had declared the Postmaster-General's action ultra vires. The Transvaal 
court had relied on earlier decisions which nullified racial discrimination in 
municipal by-laws where the hlCilities were separate but equal. S2 These earlier 
decisions had been based on an English decision which held that discriminatory 
legislation was null and void unless discrimination had been specifically au-
thorized by an Act of Parliament."" 
However, Judge Beyers reasoned that the requirement of Parliamentary au-
thorization for discrimination was not relevant to South Africa. To Beyers, the 
paramount consideration was that social reality impelled the court to uphold 
racial discrimination.K~ In fact, it appears that social reality, and not legal prece-
dent, was Beyers' paramount concern, especially considering that his legal rea-
soning was fallacious. For example, he stated that in the Transvaal, Europeans 
and non-Europeans were never equal in the eyes of the law. so In reality, how-
ever, sixteen years before Lord Russell wrote his decision in Kruse, the High 
Court of the South African Republic (i.e., the Transvaal) held that the courts 
77. Rasool, [1934] App. Div. at 175. (Stratford, j.. concurring). For Stratford. racial classification was 
valid if it served a useful purpose. [d. al 182 (deVilliers . .J.. concurring). According to deVilliers, 
discrimination with equality could conceivably be unreasonable, although no court would hold such 
discrimination unreasonable per se. The burden of proof would be on Ihe objecling party to show 
unreasonableness. Id. 
78. [d. at 176-78. 
79. [d. at 187 (Gardiner, j., dissenting). 
80. Sachs v. Minister of Justice, [1934] App. Div. 11. 37. 
81. See Rasool, [1934] App. Div. 167. Parliament did empower the Postmaster General "[10] issue such 
instructions as he may deem necessary for the conduct and guidance of officers in carrying out the 
provisions of the Act." Post Office Administration and Shipping Combinations Discouragement Act, 
No. 10 of 1911, § 3. 
82. See Rex v. Plaatjes, [1910] E.D.L.63; Williams & Adendorf v. Johannesburg, [1915] T.P.D. 106. 
83. Kruse v. Johnson. [1898] 2 Q.B. 91. 99. 
84. See note 78 supra. 
85. [d. 
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were obliged to be color blind in the administration of justice except where 
discrimination is expressly allowed."6 
The Rasoul decision did not end judicial controversy over the legitimacy of 
separate hut equal. But it did signal the court's willingness to uphold any 
discrimination authorized by Parliament. It forcefully indicated the inclination 
of jurists to base judicial decisions on white public opinion rather than on the 
letter of the law. The Appellate Division, in its second year of existence, had 
already deferred to white public opinion in determining the racial status of 
children enrolling in white-only schools. H7 Rasuul simply extended the policy to 
administrative actions. 
The emphasis on baasskaj), H" in the early period of the National regime, left no 
room for concern with separate but equal. White domination and white prefer-
ence was the overriding consideration which Nationalists intended to extend to 
all areas of life."" Judicial attempts to block the implementation of any aspect of 
the apartheid program had no place in the Nationalist scheme. The court did try 
to perpetuate the separate but equal doctrine to the consternation of the gov-
ernment.90 But the court's success in this regard was short-lived. The govern-
ment secured passage of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act9 ! which 
empowered local authorities to provide racially separate and unequal or racially 
exclusive facilities and services. The Act specifically prohibited the courts from 
ruling on the validity of such actions. It also denied courts the power to rule that 
separate was not equal or to require that authorities provide facilities for all 
racial groups.92 
By 1961, the court of appeal had fallen clearly into line with the government's 
objectives. A number of Indian residents of Durban brought suit to nullify a 
proclamation that the Indians claimed would result in substantial inequality for 
Indians. The residents argued that the proclamation was void because Parlia-
ment had not authorized unequal treatment of Indians. The Durban and Coastal 
Local Division agreed that Parliament had not specifically authorized inequality 
86. In re Marchane, [1882] I S.A. 27. 
87. Moller v. Keimos School Committee, [1911] App. Div. 635. 
88. See note 4 supra. 
89. When the National Party achieved power in 1948, a systematic withdrawal of all non-white rights 
took place, culminating in 1968 when Prime Minister Vorster withdrew the last vestiges of colored 
representation from the South African Parliament. "At last the dream embodied in the organisation's 
earliest constitutions had been realised, i.e., 'the segregation of all coloured races domiciled in South 
Africa with provision for their independent development under the trusteeship of whites.' " STRYDOM & 
WILKINS, supra note I, at 162 (quoting The Rand Daily Mail, December 15, 1944). 
90. See, e.g., Rex v. Abdurahman, [1950] 3 S.A. 136 (App. Div.); Tayob v. Ermelo Local Road 
Transportation Board, [1951] 4 S.A. 440 (App. Div.); Rex v. Lusu, [1953] 2 S.A. 484 (App. Div.). These 
cases held that separate facilities or treatment must not be substantially unequal. 
91. Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953. 
92. Id. § 3. 
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in conformance with the doctrine of R. v. Abdurahman. H3 The court declared that 
if, as a matter of fact. the proclamation had been issued without fulfilling certain 
prerequisites wit h respect to equal treatment, then the proclamation itself would 
be voidY" This decision was, however, reversed on appeal. The Appellate Divi-
sion held that Parliament must have known that proclamations under the Group 
Area Act"3 would result in substantial inequalities and therefore, Parliament had 
impliedlv authorized such inequalities."" 
In less than thirty years, South African courts had moved from rejection of 
segregation unless expresslv authorized by Parliament,~l7 to acceptance of segre-
gation without Parliamentary authorization only if treatment or hlcilities were 
separate and not substantially unequal,"" to acceptance of gross inequality with-
out Parliamentary authorization. In Lockhat, the court, in upholding the procla-
mation, found an implied authorization by Parliament f()r unequal treatment. 
The court stated that the Group Areas Act was a "colossal social experiment"' 
which so obviously would invo\vT "substantial inequalities" that Parliamt;nt must 
have recognized the results which would occur."" 
Thus, the South African legal culture was fully compatible with the program 
of social engineering inaugurated by the I\'ational Party regime. The courts, at 
no point, had the power to block Parliamentarily endorsed racial discrimina-
tion. tOO They were able to restrict other forms of racial discrimination only to a 
limited extent. Legal authority nen existed for the proposition that the funda-
mental legal principle of equality before the law did not apply to non-white 
South Africans. tot The pre-engagement phase of the social engineering pro-
93. The Abdurahman doctrine states: 
[IJt is the duty of the courts to hold the scales evenly between the different classes of the 
community and to declare in\"alid any practice which, in the absence of the authority of an Act 
of Parliament, results in partial and unequal treatment to a substantial degree between 
different sections of the communit\' .... 
Rex v. Abdurahman, [19501 3 S.A. 136, 145 (App. Di,.). 
94. Lockhat v. Minister of the Interior [1960] 3 S.A. 765, 790 (Durban and Coast Local Div.). 
95. Group Areas Act, 1\0. 41 of 1950. See § V.B infra. 
96. Minister of the Interior v. Lockhat, [1961) 2 S.A. 587, 602 (App. Div,). 
97. See note 82 and accompanying text ,Iupra. 
98. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. 
99. Minister of the Interior v. Lockhat, [1961] 2 S.A. 587,602 (App. Div,). 
100. In Ndlwana v. Hofmen 1\.0., [1937J App. Di,. 229, the Appellate Division held that Parlia-
ment's will, as expressed in an Act. could not "be questioned by a Court of Law whose function it i~ to 
enforce that will not to question it." Id. at 238. A unanimous judgment by the Appellate Division in 
Harris v. Minister of the Interior [1952J 2 S.A. 428 (App. Div.) overturned Ndlwarw, but Parliament 
invalidated the decision with the South Africa Act Amendment Act, 1\'0. 9 of 1956. Section 2 of the Act 
stated: "No Court of Law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any law 
passed by Parliament. ... " This provision was repealed bv the South Africa Act Amendment Act, 1\'0. 
50 of 1968. The present South African COllstitution affirms Parliamentary supremacy. See note 148 
infra. 
J 0 1. See note 78 alld accompanying text supra. 
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gram had existed, in large measure, before the Nationalists actually had devel-
oped the program itself. 
IV. THE SOCIAL ENGINEERING PROGRAM 
A. The Ba~ic Foundation 
When the Nationalist regime was inaugurated, Party leaders had a coherent 
pict ure of the social order they wished to establish. lo2 They desired to secure a 
self-perpetuating social order characterized by white domination and non-white 
acquiescence. The National Party had grown and thrived on the basis of its 
depiction as the vanguard of Afrikanerdom, not as a political party.I03 It did 
come to power, however, in a parliamentary democracy!()4 and, unlike other 
\'anguard parties, it had accepted the prevailing rules of the political process. 
Therefore. the Party could not resort to massive political action against its 
opponents in the manner of the Bolsheviks or the Chinese Communists. The 
alternative was to use the legal system as a tool for social engineering. Ironically, 
the legal culture of pre-1948 South Africa both limited the Nationalists' options 
102. In Ihe period preceding the 1948 election, different political views on South Africa's relation-
ship with England, women's rights and union rights, among other issues, emerged. Yet, with the 
exception of the Communist Party, every organized party in the land clung to the "color bar." WALKER, 
supra note 57, at 748-50. When D.F. Malan, 1948 National Party victor, was campaigning he showed that 
his 
main aim was to succeed where [the opposition] had failed by achieving apartheid, that is, 
segregation writ large, the permanent physical, mental and, as far as might be, spiritual 
separation of the four great racial groups in the Union each from the other, partly to preserve 
the racial purity of each, partly to do away with the friction that arose from intermingling and 
partly to give each the chance of developing along its own lines in its own appointed place. 
The apartheid policy had been summarised for election purposes in a pamphlet, whose 
authors recommended the idea as a product of "the experience of the established European 
population ... based on tlie Christian principles of justice and reasonableness," and proposed 
to prohibit mixed marriages, to set up a body of experts in non-European affairs, and to 
empower the authorities to supervise "the moulding of the youth" and forbid "destructive 
propaganda" carried on by outsiders against the Union's handling of its racial problems. They 
laid special stress on the position of the Cape Coloured Folk midway between the Europeans 
and the Bantu, urging that, on the one hand, they be protected against Bantu competition and 
encouraged to make Christianity "the basis of their lives" and that, on the other, they be 
segregated in every possible way. 
Id. at 769-71. Whites also laid plans to remove non-whites from significant representation in the Upper 
House of the South African Parliament and to disallow them a voice in decisions affecting political 
confidence, declarations of war or changes in their own political rights. /d. at 771. 
103. For background on the feeling of oppression experienced by Afrikaners prior to the establish-
ment of the National Party, see notes 1 and 67 supra. 
104. The triumph of the National and allied Afrikaner parties in the parliamentary election of 1948 
came as a surprise to everybody, including the Nationalists. From the point of view of popular votes, the 
National Party actually had no victory, receiving less than forty percent compared to fifty percent for 
the United Party. But from the point of view of parliamentary seats won, the results were different. The 
National Party won seventy seats compared to only sixty-five seats for the United Party. Inequality in 
population between the urban and rural districts made this result possible. The National Party carried 
the less populous rural and urban districts by a narrow margin while the United Party won the larger 
city districts by substantial majorities. VANDENBOSCH, supra note I, at 127-28. 
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and facilitated their programatic objectives. On the one hand, the principle of 
the rule of law was well entrenched. Both English common law and Roman-
Dutch law prescribed equality before the law, due process of law, judicial action 
in favorem libertatis,105 and other basic tenets of European democratic legal 
systems. On the other hand, the specific South African version of European law 
rejected the concept of equity and significantly limited the concept of equality 
before the law by confining it to white South Africans only.l06 Furthermore, 
since the beginning of the lJnion of South Africa,lo7 the court had been quite 
willing to allow public racial prejudices to influence its decisions by accepting 
implications of Parliamentary intent even when Parliament had not directly 
stated such in tent. l OH 
The apartheid program was aimed at total separation of the races. The 
Nationalists intended to convert the Native Reserves,109 which existed for the 
various African tribal groups, into National Homelands.lIo Those Africans resid-
ing in the white areas were to be repatriated to their traditional homelands. 
Twenty-six years before 1948, the Nationalists outlined strictly controlled terms 
with respect to permitting Africans in white areas: "The Native should only be 
allowed to enter the urban <ireas, which are essentially the whiteman's creation, 
when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the whiteman, and 
should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister."lll Carried to its logical 
105. Infavorem libertat~\· means "in favor ofliberty." E.g., Ex parte Justus, 3 Okla. Crim. III, 104 P. 933 
(1909). 
106. See § 1ll.B supra. 
107. Because of their dissatisfaction with British rule in the early nineteenth century, see note I supra, 
the Afrikaners undertook what is called the Great Trek during the middle years of that century. 
VANDENBOSCH. supra note I, at 6; SACKS, supra note I. at 7. As a result of this Afrikaner push into the 
African interior, two republics, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (generally called 
the Transvaal), emerged. Britain, for many years, practiced a contradictory policy with regard to these 
states, annexing them and then restoring internal self-government, restoring the right to conduct their 
own foreign relations and then reserving a veto on treaty-making powers. With the discovery of gold 
and diamonds in 1870, however. Britain determined to establish her supremacy over all of South 
Africa. The conHict between the newly reimposed leadership and its subjects' intense desire to do as 
they pleased resulted in the Boer War, known by the Afrikaners as "The Second War for Freedom." 
Britain succeeded in annexing the two republics in 1902. VANDENBOSCH, supra note 1, at 7. 
Britain granted the republics responsible government in 1906, thereby joining Cape Colony and 
Natal, who had been granted such independence respectively in 1872 and 1843. The four areas formed 
a Union in 1910, becoming a federation under the Crown. Although this transformation cost the 
colonies their right of self-government, the new, larger political entity began with a popularly (white) 
elected parliament and a ministry responsible to the parliament. Id. at 7-8. See generally POLITICAL 
HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1979, at 391-96 (A. Banks ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL 
HANDBOOK]. 
108. See, e.g., Moller v. Keimoes School Committee, [1911] App. Div. 635. 
109. Native Reserves are lands set aside for exclusive ownership by designated tribal groups under 
the Native Land Act, No. 27 of 1913, § 1. and the Native Trust and Land Act. No. 18 of 1936. 
110. See Promotion of Black Self-Government Act, No. 46 of 1959. preamble. 
Ill. REPORT OF THE TRANSVAAL LOCAL GOVERNMEN"l COMMISSION, reprinted in 1 TRANSVAAL PAPERS 
~ 42 (1922). 
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conclusion, the program would transform South Africa into a collection of 
racially homogeneous, self·sufficient, mutually exclusive communities. 
In fact, such communities are a fanciful goal. The tribal homelands established 
for the African population provide only 14% of the land area for 70% of the 
population. 112 The intermediate racial groups (the Coloured and Asian groups) 
do not have homelands. 1 13 Instead of separate development, the program marks 
the intermediate groups for "parallel development" in the white areas.114 But 
more significantly, total separation actually conflicts with the social ideal because 
both white hegemony and non-white ministering to whites would require inter-
racial contact. 115 
B. The Basic Plan 
1. Reinstitutionalization of Old Social Norms 
The South African social engineering program has been a program of integra-
tion, not segregation.116 When the Nationalists came to power, the patterns of 
interracial contact which had characterized the pre-British era rested on diffuse 
institutionalized social obligations. The object of the Nationalist social engineer-
ing program was to reinstitutionalize those social norms which upheld the 
Afrikaner vision of the ideal social order, through the use of law. The primary 
purpose of law, in this regard, was to insure that the essential foundation for 
preservation of diffuse obligations was securely established. The essential foun-
dation necessary, in the case of apartheid, was broadly accepted racial stereotyp-
ing. 
The Nationalists, through control of public policy, were determined to create 
the proper environment for reinstitutionalization of the old norms.117 They 
112. See note 109 sufrra. See also POLITICAL HANDBOOK, sUfrra note 107, at 393-94. 
113. See Rhoodie, The Coloured Policy of South Africa: Parallelism as a Socio-Political Device to Regulate 
White-Coloured Integration, 72 AFR. AFF. 46,47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rhoodie]. 
114. Id. "Parallel development" has been the method by which the Nationalists have carried out a 
policy of non-integration and non-domination of these groups. The National Party recognizes the 
coloured group as a minority partner sharing a common motherland with the whites. Id. at 48. 
115. See id. at 47. 
II6. Dr. D. Malan, the first National Party Prime Minister, told the House of Assembly that apartheid 
did not aim at territorial separation. 71 REpUB. S. AFR. HOUSE OF Ass. DEB., col. 4250-51 (1950). 
II 7. Although the Nationalists saw their 1948 legal program in this light, they took the initial steps 
toward apartheid during the 1930's under General Hertzog, the founder of the National Party: 
The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 almost doubled the amount of land set aside [for natives] 
... to 17,660,290 [morg~n lor from 7.3 per cent to 12.3 per cent for 8,000,000 natives against 
125,000,000 morgen for 2,000,000 Europeans. The expectation was that besides 3,000,000 
natives already living in the reserves, another 3,000,000 currently employed also could be 
settled there. As for the 2,000,000 living in urban centers and engaged industrially by white 
employers, they would be housed in locations. The Natives Representation Act of 1936 
removed native voters in Cape Colony and Natal from the common role. A vote of one 
hundred sixty-nine to eleven fulfilled the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority 
of the combined two houses. Henceforth, natives meeting property and educational qualifica-
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intended to use the legal system to preserve and reinforce racial stereotyping by 
blocking interpersonal relationships across racial linesYs The Nationalists 
theorized that if individuals had no direct knowledge of the personal qualities of 
members of other groups, they would be left with few, if any, alternatives to 
government-defined stereotypes. Conversely, the government-defined stereo-
types could condition the interracial encounters that did occur. 
2. Use of Coherent Legislative Plan 
According to the Nationalists, the prevailing racial segregation system in 1948 
was so full of loopholes that it encouraged non-whites to forget their place in 
society.119 In place of the piecemeal approach to racial separation that charac-
terized segregation prior to the Nationalist regime,120 the National Party devel-
oped a coherent body of social legislation to regulate racial interaction121 and to 
sanction behavioral norms that uphold the racial hierarchy.122 The laws attempt 
to limit most interracial contact to situations which do not provide the opportu-
tions were to have a separate voting role to elect three whites to the House of Assembly and 
four whites to the Senate. In addition, a native representative council with the function of an 
advisory body on native affairs was set up, consisting of twelve elected and four nominated 
members plus the five chief native commissioners. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 
required a rigorous enforcement of the pass system to control native movement from rural and 
reserve areas to urban labor centers. Powers were bestowed to determine what towns the 
natives could enter and even to send them home. 
SACKS, supra note I, at 263-64. 
118. Specifically, the government enacted severe penalties against mixed marriages and illicit physi-
cal relations between the races. An elaborate system of permits and passes was contained in a "so-called 
reference book." which the law required each Bantu to keep on his person at all times. An amenities act 
called for separate facilities in all public buildings and areas. 
The crowning feature was the creation of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development to replace the Department Native Affairs. It would be responsible for adminis-
tration of reserves, recruitment of labor, and the municipal locations. In this connection, the 
Bantu Laws Amendment of 1964 set up a state-controlled system of labor bureaus empowered to 
determine the admission of natives into white areas for work and permission could be withheld 
on such varied grounds as [undesirability or the existence of a labor surplus]. 
SACKS, supra note 1, at 264-65. 
119. For example, upon their election, the National Party refused to honor the promise of General 
Hertzog to the Cape coloured population that they would have political rights, residential areas, and 
educational and job opportunities detached from the environment of the Bantu. SACKS, supra note I, at 
265. The Cape coloured population, comprised of several generations of intermarriage and irregular 
physical relations between Bushmen, Hottentots, slaves and Europeans, had a pre-1948 history of 
attempts to link themselves with the white community. 1d. at 2. Since the National Party victory, 
however, only those who can pass the test of a white person by appearance and by general repute and 
acceptance are allowed to enjoy white rights. Those who pass this test must sever all bonds with their 
blacker relatives "or else risk detection and transfer to a non-European register." !d. at 265. 
120. Compare note 117 with note 118 supra (to see the distinctions between pre-1948 and post-1948 
segregation law). 
121. For a discussion of the National Party program, see S. AFR. BUREAU Of RACIAL AFf., DR. MALAN'S 
POLlCY FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S MIXED POPULATION (1948); S. AFR. BUREAU OF RACIAL An., INTEGRATION 
OR SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT? (1952); S. AFR. BUREAU OF RACIAL AFF., BANTU EDUCATION: OPPRESSION OR 
OPPORTUNITY? (1955). 
122. See § V infra. 
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nitv fiJI' deviation from desired patterns. Since the Afrikaner social ideal is 
dependent on anonymous and impersonal interracial interaction,ln the primary 
intent of t he legislation is to block affective ties between racial linesY" 
The l\'ationalists have structured the legal system to allow racial intermixture 
fi)]' the purpose of securing non-white labor and senice, while concurrently 
prohibiting personal im'ol\ements that could undermine racial stereotyping. 
l\Jore importantly. the system works to secure acquiescence of the non-whites to 
their subjugation. Whites and non-whites do interact; hut the law insures that 
the\' interact only in confeJl'mance with regime values. 
V. THE SOCIAL ENGI)\'EERI1\'G LEGISLATlO1\' 
The specific social engineering legislative package consists of fiJUr groups of 
laws which discourage. or ban outright, affective ties between members of 
different racial groups: The Population Registration Act blocks social fraterniza-
tion;12:; the residential segregation laws block neighborhood affiliation;126 the 
pass laws block self-actualization;127 and the anti-miscegenation laws block sexual 
intimacy 12H Each of the four groups of laws effects desired behavioral norms 
from a differellt perspective. Together, they amount to a coherent program of 
social engineering. 
A. The Population Registration Act 
I. Introduction 
The Population Registration Act I2 (. has a primarily declaratory function. The 
Act prmides for identification of each individual's racial group membership. 
The effect of this Act is to insure that each individual has a societal status, on a 
group basis. l:lo and that he does not move from his "natural" group into a higher 
group on the socio-racial scale. l:ll The Nationalists did not invent the racially 
based hierarchy. They did not invent race group differentiation. But the Na-
tionalists did initiate an effort to fortify the boundaries of the groups. The 
underlying assumption of the Population Registration Act is that. the state must 
123. See note 62 supra. 
124. See § V infra. 
125. SPf § V.A infra. 
126. See § V.B infra. 
127. See § V.D infra. 
128. Sa § V.C infra. 
129. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950. 
130. ld. § 3. 
131. See § V.A.2 infra. 
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keep members of the subordinate groups in their place in order to protect the 
racial hierarchyY12 
The Population Registration Act is more than just declaratory; it is also 
expressive. It requires every citizen and every resident alien to register with the 
census bureau. I:1:1 The bureau then assigns each person a number and a racial 
classificationY~ The Population Registration Act expresses the overriding im-
portance of group membership by, in effect, depersonalizing the individual and 
fixing his place in the social system. The Act identifies a person's privileges and 
obligations,I:15 it makes race an essential element of his self-definition, and it 
reinforces the social color bar. Ultimately, the Population Registration Act facili-
tates acquiescence to the system by limiting interpersonal relationships across the 
color line to acceptable forms. Further, The Act forms a basis for the operation 
of the other discriminatory measures which comprise the apartheid program. 
2. Classifications Under the Population Registration Act 
The Population Registration Act identifies four broad radal groups. Individ-
uals become members of a group on the basis of physical appearance and social 
status. The Act states that: 
1. "white person" means a person who a) in appearance obviously is 
a white person and who is not generally accepted as a coloured 
person; b) is generally accepted as a white person and is not m 
appearance obviously not a white person. 
2. "black" means a person who is, or is generally accepted as, a 
member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. 
3. "Coloured person" means a person who is not a white person, or a 
biackY6 
132. The National Party's position on the need to impose rigid boundaries between the racial groups 
is set out in the House of Assembly debates on the Population Registration Act. 71 REPUB. S. AFR. 
HOUSE OF Ass. DEB., cols. 2498-3159, 5666-6100 (1950). The debates are summarized in G. CARTER, 
THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 81-84 (1959) [hereinafter cited as CARTER]' 
That the courts have accepted the implications of the Population Registration Act is clear from the 
statement that "[aJ person's classification ... affects his status in practically all fields of life, social, 
economic, and political." Mohamood v. Secretary for the Interior [1974] 2 S.A. 402, 407 (Cape 
Provincial Div.). 
133. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 2. 
134. Id. § 6, amended by Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 29 of 1970. 
135. All South African citizens have the obligation to obtain identification cards and to furnish 
information. Blacks have the additional obligation to carry the cards at all times and to show the cards 
on demand in order to receive the privileges of traveling to certain restricted areas and obtaining 
employment. See Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950. See also § V.DA infra. 
136. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § I, amended by Population Registration Amend-
ment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § I(a) and Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 61 of 1962, § 1. See 
also Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950 § 5(5), amended by Population Registration Amendment 
Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 2(c). 
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To further accentuate fragmentation in the subordinate groups, the program 
further classifies Africans l;l7 by tribe,l;lH and coloureds by subgroup (e.g., Cape 
Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Indian, Chinese, etc.)Yl9 
Once a person has been classified, he has the right to appeal his c1assifica-
tion.I')o He can make his appeal, in the first instance, to one of the two classifica-
tion appeal boards which are located in Cape Town and Pretoria.HI Further 
appeal lies with the courts and ultimately with the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court .112 However, the appellate process offers scant relief to ag-
grieved individuals. An individual has only thirty days in which to initiate the 
appeal process.1 "3 The census bureau, on the other hand, can re-open a case at 
any time. IH A case may be reopened for any reason, including anonymous 
infcJrmation that a person has been "passing."1.j5 However, reclassification of an 
individual may only occur after giving him both prior notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. J.jH 
Redress to the courts is of dubious value to misclassified individuals. The 
courts have recognized that an individual's official racial classification is of 
paramount importance to him and that misclassification or malicious investiga-
tion of his lineage can have "devastating effects" on his Iife. l47 Nevertheless, 
since the courts may not pass judgement on acts of Parliament,14H and since the 
legal system does not recognize equitable relief, there is little a court can do. 149 
Appeals to the court may be based only on ultra vires issues, acts by the classifica-
tion appeal board or incorrect c1assification. 150 Neither basis is open to significant 
judicial intenention. 
137. Africans and Blacks are used interchangeably for the purposes of this article. 
138. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 7(2)(b). 
139. [d. § 5(2). Coloured sub-groups were defined by S. Afr. Gov't Proc. No. 46 of 1959. See INT'L 
COMM. JURISTS, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW 22 (1960). 
140. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 11(1), amended by Population Registration 
Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 3(a). 
141. [d. § 11(4), amended by Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 64 of 1967, § 4. 
142. [d. § 11(8), amended by Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 64 of 1967, § 4. 
143. Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 71 of 1956, § 6, amended by Population Registra-
tion Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 3(c). 
144. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 5(3), amended by Population Registration 
Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 2(a). 
145. See id. "The classification may be changed at any time it appear.1 to the Secretary that it is 
incorrect." (emphasis added). [d. 
146. [d. § 11(4), substituted by Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 64 of 1967, § 4. If the 
aggrieved person appeals the classification to the courts, he has an opportunity to present evidence on 
his behalf and to cross-examine witnesses. ld. 
147. See, e.g., Mohamood v. Secretary for the Interior [1974J 2 S.A. 402, 407 (Cape Provincial Div.). 
148. "No court of law shall be competent to inquire into or to pronounce upon the validity of any Act 
passed by Parliament." Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 32 of 1961, § 59(2). 
149. See Sachs v. Minister of Justice, [1932J App. Div. II, 37. "Parliament may make any encroach-
ment it chooses upon the life, liberty or property of any individual subject. ... It is the function of the 
courts of law to enforce its will." ld. 
150. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of \950, § 11(1), amended by Population Registration 
Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 3(a). 
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Procedurally, in all cases before the bureau, the burden of proof is on the 
individual and not the officials.151 The individual must prove that the classifica-
tion is wrong, whereas the government need not prove it is right. In contested 
cases, the government asks detailed questions about the individual's life and 
carefully scrutinizes his physical features as well as the physical features and 
backgrounds of his relatives. 152 
With respect to judicial determination of the correctness of classification, the 
courts have continued the traditional practice of relying on popular opinion to 
define racial classifications. In the Appellate Division's second term, the court 
had to settle the issue of whether a child with three white grandparents had the 
right to attend a school reserved for whites only.153 The court ruled, in an 
opinion written by Chief Justice de Villiers, that "[i]n construing a vague expres-
sion ... like that of 'European parentage or extraction or descent,' the Court 
should endeavor to ascertain its popular sense."154 The court, accordingly, 
upheld the decision of the school committee to prevent enrollment of the 
student who was not entirely European. 155 Later, in R. v. Radebe the court 
indicated that in cases of mixed parentage involving exclusively non-white par-
ents, a person should be classified in the higher status group unless there was "an 
appreciable, substantial or overwhelming preponderance of native blood."156 
The court was guided by the principle that "ordinary use of language does not 
permit us to describe a person who has one Indian and one native or African 
parent as a native with Indian blood in him."157 
The court has continually upheld the amorphous (and from an anthropologi-
calor genetic perspective, spurious) definitions of racial groups included in the 
Population Registration Act on the grounds that these definitions reflect com-
mon usage. 15H Moreover, once the census bureau has classified an individual, the 
burden is on that individual to produce conclusive evidence of pedigree differ-
ent from the government assigned classification.159 The court's willingness to 
151. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 19(1), amended by Population Registration 
Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 7. 
152. M. HORRELL, RACE CLASSIFICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: ITS EFFECTS ON HUMAN BEINGS 31-32 
(1959). See also Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 1(2), amended by Population Registration 
Amendment Act, No. 64 of 1967, § I, which states that on defining a person's racial classification his 
"habits, education and speech and deportment and demeanor shall be taken into account." 
153. Moller v. Keimoes School Committee, [1911) App. Div. 635. 
154. [d. at 643. 
155. Id. at 644. 
156. Ret v. Radebe, [1945) App. Div. 590, 611. 
157. /d. at 610. The court ruled that a person with one Indian parent and one native parent would 
not be considered a native under the statute. 
158. 5. v. Bhoolia, [1970) 4 S.A. 692 (App. Div.). 
159. See Immorality Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1950, § 4. "Any person who seems in appearance to 
be a European or non-European, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be such until the contrary is 
proved. The burden of proving error to be on the individual claiming it." /d. 
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uphold the government defined racial classifications, together with the practices 
of the census bureau, serve to legitimize the classification scheme. 
A person's classification is always subject to change.!60 For an individual 
assigned to any group higher than the status of black, the Population Registra-
tion Act discourages an individual to do anything that would jeopardize his 
position. A white person is especially vulnerable. A white person can maintain his 
classification only if he is both white in appearance and accepted as white by the 
white community at large.!6! No matter how obviously white he may be in 
appearance, if he has too many non-white friends, or if he spends too much time 
associating with non-whites, the government can reclassify him. Because of the 
extreme consequences of being relegated to a subordinate group, the Population 
Registration Act deters friendships across the color line.!S2 
B. Re.lidential Segregation Statute.1 
I. Introduction 
The Group Areas Act l6 ;l and the other statutes governing residential pat-
terns!",! pnl\'ide the mechanism for differential distribution of social benefits 
according to race. In contrast to the indirect approach of the Population Regis-
tration Act, the Group Areas Act directly blocks affective ties between racial lines 
by preventing interpersonal bonds derived from neighborhood affiliation. 
As in the case of the Population Registration Act, the Nationalists did not 
ilwent a new area of discrimination with the Group Areas Act. Long before the 
current regime came to power, the official governmental policy had been to 
confine Africans to special locations in the urban areas. One of the first projects 
undertaken at the Cape settlement of 1652 was to plant a hedge of bitter 
almonds to separate the Dutch garrison from the coloured population. ls5 In the 
Orange Free State,166 whites excluded Asians from residence and real property 
160. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 5, amended by Population Registration Amend-
ment Act, No. 106 of 1969, § 2\a}. 
161. [d. §§ 1,2 amended by Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 61 of 1962, § I and 
Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 64 of 1967, § I and Population Registration Amendment 
Act, No. 106 of 1969, § I(c}. 
162. See note 119 supra. 
163. Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966 (amending Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950 and Group Areas 
Act. No. 77 of 1957). 
164. These include the Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966; the N.atives' (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act, No. 25 of 1945; the Black Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927; and the Black Resettlement Act, No. 
19 of 1954. 
165. 2 LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE EAST INDIA COMPANY; 1649-1662,274.309,340 (I 899}, cited in 
WALKER, supra note 57, at 41 n. 3. 
166. See note 107 supra. 
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ownership.167 On a larger scale, the Union Parliamentl68 set aside approximately 
14% of the land area of South Africa for the exclusive ownership by the African 
population via the Native's Land Act l69 and the Native's Trust and Land Act.170 
The Nationalists made residential segregation all-encompassing by applying it to 
all racial groups and by making it mandatory. 
2. History of Residential Segregation 
The public policy of residential segregation was firmly established by the 
middle of the Nineteenth Century. The white settlers, both Dutch and English, 
wanted an easily accessible reservoir of cheap labor as slavery had been abolished 
in the British Empire in 1833.171 The whites also wanted the Africans separated 
from the white community. The last Dutch Governor of the Cape had ordered 
that special areas be set aside for detribalized Africans.172 But not until 1844, at 
Uiten hage, did the whites force the removal of the Fingoes (detribalized Africans) 
and the Khoi Khoi (Hottentots) to separate locations outside of town.173 In 1849, 
the British Colonial Secretary ordered the Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Harry 
Smith, to take the next logical step, i.e., to establish permanent African locations 
near each European settlement. l74 Since that time, each major municipality in 
South Ahica has consisted of two linked, but separate, towns: a white city and a 
black satellite township.17.> 
Not until 1923, however, did the white government form an explicit national 
policy on residential patterns. In that year, Parliament passed the first Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. 176 The Act allowed cities in all four provinces 
to require Africans to live in either official locations or employer provided 
lodgings. This act also empowered local authorities to expel unemployed and 
undesirable Africans from these officiallocations.177 A companion act, the Black 
167. Law to Provide against the Influx of Asiatics, ORANGE RIVER COLONY, STAT. LAWS, ch. 33 
(1891). 
168. For a discussion of the formation of the Union and Union Parliament by the Orange Free State 
and other republics, see note 107 supra. 
169. Native's Land Act, No. 27 of 1913. 
170. Native's Trust and Land Act, No. 18 of 1936. 
171. The Slavery Abolition Act, 1833,3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 73. See 25 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 
at 989-1020 (2d ed. 1951) fora complete statutory history of Great Britain's abolition of the slave trade. 
172. C. DEKIEWIET, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 34 (1941) [hereinafter cited as DEKIEWIET]. 
173. Jones, Social and Economic Conditions of the Urban Native, in WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND THE 
NATIVES OF SOUTH AFRICA 159 (I. Schapera ed. 1934). 
174. [d. 
175. For a discussion of the history and recent status of residential segregation in South Africa, see 
generally Degrees and Kinds, supra note 62. 
176. Native's Land Act of 1923, No. 21 of 1923, § J, repealed by the Natives' (Urban Areas) Consolida-
tion Act, No. 25 of 1945. ("Natives," "Bantu" and "Black" are used interchangeably in South African 
statute reponers). Ed. 
177. Native's Land Act, No. 21 of 1923, § 17(1). 
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Administration Act, I 7H empowered the Governor-General to order, without 
prior notice, any tribe, portion of a tribe or individual to reside in a designated 
place.t 79 
Thus, when the Nationalists took power, a dear precedent already existed for 
enforcing residential racial segregation. For them, however, the existing legisla-
tion was too limited. The Nationalists considered a new body of statutes neces-
sary to control residential patterns in conformity with official ideology.tHO The 
Nationalists recognized that neighborhood affiliation was a potential source of 
interracial contact that could undermine official racial stereotypes. t"! They felt 
that unacceptable interracial contact needed to be outlawed between white and 
black, between white and coloured, and between the various non-white groups. 
The Natives (Crban Areas) Consolidation Act was inadequate because it applied 
only to blacks.!HZ The Group Areas Act extended residential controls to all racial 
groups. I H:l 
3. Current Segregation Under the Group Areas Act 
The Group Areas Act empowers the Government to reserve anv area for the 
exclusive residence, ownership or occupation of a specific group. Such areas are 
designated as "group areas."!H4 This act also allows the Government to declare 
17R. Black Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927. 
179. [d. § 5( I). 
180. The theory of apartheid was worked out in 1947 by a group, consisting mainly of professors. at 
Stallenbosch. "the heart of [South African] intellectual nationalism." WALKER, supra note 57, at 770. 
There. future ministers of the ~ational Party government undertook to conduct research into racial 
problems and to advise thereon: 
[d. 
Taking it for granted that white prejudice 011 the score of colour was unalterable. they worked 
out a well-reasoned case for apartheul based on European supremacy. It \vas no mere blueprint 
for oppression, hut in many ways an idealistic programme for the protection of the interests of 
each racial group and the /(lStering of goodwill and co-operation between them by the 
complete segregation of each group, including, of course, the white folk. 
In his election manifesto, D.H. Malan called upon the white people to save themselves "without 
oppression and with [due regard] to the natural rights of non-Europeans to a proper living and their 
right to their o\vn development in accordance with their own requirements and capabilities." [d. at 
771-72. He proposed that, /(Jr a start. the Bantu be deprived of all representation in Parliament and the 
Cape Provincial Council. !d. See "lso notes 117-118 supra. The National Party's position on the need for 
comprehensive residential racial segregation is presented in the House of Assembly debates on the 
Group Areas Act. 73 REPUB. S. AFR. Hot:SE OF Ass. DEB., cols. 7433-7826, 8773-R830 (1950). The 
debates are summarized in CARTER, supra note 132, at 85-91. 
181. A legal advisor to the Group Areas Board has said that "the clashes and difficulties between 
persons of different races whiLh other countries have experienced had their origins almost entirely in 
undesirable occupation." F. ROCSSEAU. HANDBOOK ON THE GROUP AREAS ACT 8-9 (1960). 
182. "Iative's (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. No. 25 of 1945. § 43. This section exempts coloured 
from the requirement of Pass laws except in the Orange Free State. 
183. Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966. Section 12 oflhis Act established and defined groups f(Jr all 
races; Section 23 empowered the state president to declare an area a group area. 
184. Id. § 23. 
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any area as a "controlled area," i.e., an area in which existing patterns of 
multiracial ownership and/or residence are to be held constant pending procla-
mation of group area status. 185 Under further provisions, no one may own 
immovable property within a group area in which he does not have the right of 
residence. IHR The Group Areas Act also grants the state president the power to 
define any ethnic, linguistic, cultural or other non-white group as a designated 
group to be accorded treatment under the terms of the ACt. 187 
Aside from custom, coloureds and Asians did not live separately from either 
whites or Africans. The coloureds and Asians who were very poor lived among 
the Africans. Those with more money lived among the poorer whites. lR8 The 
Nationalists considered this situation unacceptable for a number of reasons. IS9 
Such intermixing of Africans and coloureds could weaken the feelings of isola-
tion on the part of each group. According to this theory, merely keeping whites 
separate from non-whites is not enough. Further, affective bonds between mem-
bers of the subordinate groups could result in monolithic, rather than frag-
mented opposition against whites. 
The intermixing of coloureds and Indians with the poor whites was of special 
concern. The Nationalists saw the poor whites as on the border in the racial 
hierarchy between the white and coloured racial blocs. 19o The Nationalists 
feared that propinquity was an invitation to fellowship. They especially feared 
that, notwithstanding the antimiscegenation laws, the poor whites might become 
185. [d. § 1. 
186. [d. §§ 13. 14. 30. 
187. [d. § 12(2). 
188. The "poor white problem" permeated racial segregation in South Africa as early as the turn of 
the twenlieth century. See generally Doxey. Enforced Racial Stratificatinn in the South African Labour Market. 
in SOVTH AFRICA: SOCIOLOL;tCAL PERSPECTIVES 273 (H. Adam ed. 1971). 
Id. 
Many of the whites who chose to try their luck in Kimberley or Johannesburg were largely 
backward subsistence farmers who had no acquaintance with a money economy and who had 
little or no formal education. Essentially they were equipped for little else than the "Kaffir" 
work which they despised as beneath the dignity of the white man .... It was not simply a 
problem of poverty but of the state of mind which accompanied it. How could one be expected 
to compete with people whom the dictates of tradition designated inferior? 
189. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development presented an official statement on the 
problem of racial intermixing on the traditional pattern. S. AFR. B-eREAu OF RACIAL AFF., INTEGRATION 
OR SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT (1952). For an earlier discussion of the issue, which is considered to have 
been extremely influential in shaping policy once the r\"ationalists came to power, see G. CRONJE, 'r--' 
TUISTE VIR DIE NAGESLAG (1952). For an English language discussion of this book and its influence. see 
W. DEKLERK, THE PURITANS IN AFRICA 199-229 (1976). See aLIO notes 119 & 188 supra. 
190. The fact that in 1934 a Volkskongres (council of the people) -;"as convened to discuss the issue, 
demonstrates the extreme importance which the Afrikaners attached to the poor-white problem. A 
four-day meeting took place in Kimberley in October 1934. Hendrik Verwoerd, the youngest of the 
twelve organizers. made the first major speech after the opening preliminaries. He argued that the 
problem required a racial solution. Verwoerd's role in the kongres set the stage for his predominant role 
in shaping the slogan of apartheid into a political program. The Volkskongres and Verwoerd's role in it 
are discussed in A. HEPPLE. VERWOERD 24-34, 27 (1967). See also note 188 supra. 
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a funnel through which would "pour a debasing stream of uncivilized blood."I91 
The racial integrity of the white group, as well as the racial hierarchy, was, 
therefore, a major concern. 
The Group Areas Act provides for more than just the designatjon of separate 
residential areas. It also provides for the removal, by force, if necessary, of any 
person from a designated area who is not entitled to be in that area. 192 The result 
of enforcement of the Group Areas Act, the Natives' (Urban Areas) Consolida-
tion Act,19!l and the Bantu Resettlement Act,194 which provides for segregation 
by tribe in African areas, has been a massive shift in the population and the 
transformation of South African urban areas into patchworks of racially homo-
geneous neighborhoods and ghettos. 195 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how 
many individuals or families the Nationalists have forced to move as a result of 
these acts as no figures are available for resettlement of blacks. Table 1 does 
show, however, the effect of Group Areas proclamation on resettlement of the 
non-black groups. 
As in the case of the Population Registration Act,196 the law affords little 
protection to victims of the residential control laws. As was discussed above,197 
the protection of South African citizens from unauthorized racial discrimination 
received a severe setback in Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v. Rasool,19H when the 
Appellate Division held that separate facilities did not constitute illegitimate 
discrimination if the facilities were not substantially unequal. Whatever protec-
tion survived Rasool was severely undermined by the court in Minister of the 
Interior P. Lockhat. 199 
In Lockhat, a number of Indians contested the validity of a removal order 
based on a group area proclamation.20o The order required the Indians to leave 
a traditionally Indian section of Durban and to settle in a patently inferior 
191. DEKIEWIET, supra note 172, at 221. 
192. Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966, § 46(2)(a). When a person is convicted of occupying premises 
(i'om which he is excluded, the court may order his ejectment and confer sufficient authority to carry 
out the order. I d. 
193. Native's (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945. 
194. Bantu Resettlement Act, No. 19 of 1954. 
195. On the eve of the 1948 victory, Dr. Verwoerd, then a National Party leader, enunciated the 
"group areas principle" to be applied through up-and-coming Party legislation: "Just. as I want to have 
the situation that the Bantu must live apart from the Whites, so I want to separate the Indian from the 
Bantu and the Coloured from both." BALLINGER, supra note 2, at 209. For a discussion of the history and 
recent status of residential segregation in South Africa, see generally Degrees and Kinds, supra note 62. 
196. See § V.A.2 supra. 
197. See § IIl.B supra. 
198. [1934] App. Div. 167. 
199. [1961] 2 S.A. 587 (App. Div.). 
200. S. Afr. Gov't Proc. No. 152 of 1958, reprinted in GoVERNMENT GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY 6068 
(1958). This Proclamation was issued under The Group Areas Act, No. 77 of 1957, § 20(1). 
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TABLE 1 
RESETTLEMENT IN GROUP AREAS 1950-1979 
Residential Commercial 
Families 
Designated Families Persons to be 
Group Areas Resettled Resettled Resettled Resettled Disqualified 
White 834 2225 8299 104 21 79 
Coloured 541 72392 374990 13941 129 200 
Indian 230 34294 172156 11840 1965 3113 
Total 1605 108911 555445 25885 2115 3392 
Source: SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
1979, at 463-466 (l980). 
location.20I The lower court202 had relied on the precedent of R. v. Ab-
durahman 203 in which the Appellate Division had unanimously ruled that differ-
ential treatment based on race was illegitimate if not specifically authorized by 
Parliament. The lower court held that because the Group Areas Act did not 
specifically authorize unequal treatment and because the Reservation of Sepa-
rate Amenities Act204 authorized unequal treatment but did not include residen-
tial controls, the removal order was unauthorized by Parliament and therefore 
was ultra vires.205 The Appellate Division reversed the lower court. In an opin-
ion written by Judge of Appeal Holmes, the court held that the Group Areas Act 
was a "colossal social experiment"206 and that "Parliament must have envisaged 
... substantial inequalities."207 In other words, because the Act contemplates 
discrimination and inequality on a massive scale, any administrative action under 
the Act which results in discrimination and inequality on a small scale is legiti-
mate and consistent with the will, if not the express intent, of Parliament. The 
courts are likely to declare a removal order under the Group Areas Act invalid208 
only when no alternative residential accommodations are available at a site to 
which the government orders an individual to be removed. 
201. The plaintiff-respondent complained that there was "a striking disparity between the accommo-
dation, housing and amenities available in areas [open to Blacks] as compared with that available in 
areas [that were restricted to Whites ]." Ministeroflnteriorv. Lockhat, [1961]2 S.A. 587, 601 (App.Div). 
202. Lockhat v. Minister of the Interior, [1960] 3 S.A. 765, 786 (Durban & Coast Local Div.). 
203. [1950] 3 S.A. 136 (App. Div.). 
204. Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953. See § 1l1.B supra. 
205. Lockhat v. Minister of the Interior, [1960] 3 S.A. 765 (Durban & Coast Local Div.). 
206. Minister of Interior v. Lockhat, [1961] 2 S.A. 587, 602 (App. Div.). 
207. [d. 
208. See S. v. Variawa, [1968] 1 S.A. 711 (Transvaal Provincial Div.) (each case must be determined 
individually). 
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4. Segregation Under the Other Residential Segregation Statutes 
For Africans, the residential segregation statutes provide even less opportu-
nity for redress of grievances than the Group Areas Act. As early as 1935, the 
Transvaal Provincial Divi$ion of the Supreme Court held that the power of the 
state president to order the removal, under the Black Administration Act,209 of 
an African to a location ~ith no facilities, was valid.210 The Black Administration 
Act, as originally passed, provided Africans with the right to a hearing before 
execution of a removal order.211 When the court voided an order because of the 
denial of such a hearing,212 the government responded as it had in other 
situations where court decisions had limited the power of government authority. 
Parliament passed the Black Administration Amendment ACt.213 This amend-
ment explicitly terminated the right to a hearing in removal cases.214 
The court, thereafter, took a harder anti-African position on the residual right 
of an individual to request a statement of the reasons for a removal order. In 
Mabe v. Minister for Native Affairs,215 the court held that an order was not invalid 
merely because the reasons provided in the statement were untrue, as long as the 
enforcing officer acted in good faith. Later, the court abandoned the use of 
requests for reasons as a procedural safeguard. The court subsequently inter-
preted the statutory right of the government to withhold reasons on the grounds 
of national security, to mean that the government had full discretion to deter-
mine the security implications of any order.216 
Later in 1956, the Nationalist Government took action to pre~lude judicial 
interference in orders arising under the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act.217 The Bantu (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act218 prevents a court from 
granting a stay of a removal order for the purpose of hearing a judicial challenge 
to the validity of the order. The South African courts' interpretation of this Act 
further eroded the procedural rights of non-whites. In R. v. Rampaii,219 the 
Transvaal Division ruled that no appeal from a removal order is available if the 
government authority issuing the order is satisfied that the person ordered to 
resettle is a threat to peace and order.220 
209. Black Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927. 
210. Rex v. Mabi, [1935] T.P.D. 408. 
211. Black Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927. 
212. Saliwa v. Minister of Native Affairs, [1956] 2 S.A. 310 (App. Div.). 
213. Black Administration Amendment Act, No. 42 of 1956. 
214. !d. § 5(b) states that the governor general may, "[ w ]henever he deems it expedient in the general 
public interest without prior notice to any person concerned order that ... any tribe, portion of tribe, 
black community or black shall be withdrawn from any place to any other place .... " 
215. [1958] 2 S.A. 506 (Transvaal Provincial Div.). 
216. Joyi v. Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, [1961] I S.A. 210 (Cape Town 
Provincial Div.). See Van der Linde v. Calitz, [1967] 2 S.A. 239 (App. Div.). 
217. Native's (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, § 2. 
218. Bantu (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act, No. 64 of 1956, § 2. 
219. [1957] 4 S.A. 561 (Transvaal Provincial Div.). 
220. !d. 
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5. Positive Inducements of Residential Segregation Policy 
Developments in the area of residential segregation law have been similar to 
developments in the Population Registration Act area. Before 1948, the legal 
culture, as reflected in both statute and case law, was compatible with the 
Nationalist program. 221 Once in power, the Nationalists then extended the ambit 
of their legal controls. Nevertheless, the policy of residential segregation differs 
in a significant respect from the policy in other areas of the apartheid program. 
In addition to the negative inducements to acquiescence, the residential segrega-
tion policy also includes positive inducements. 
These positive inducements take the form of partial compensation for strict 
residential segregation. The government has employed two specific devices to 
blunt non-white resentment of white affluence: (1) the government has offered 
an improved quality of life for the residents of the separate areas, and (2) the 
government has conferred tangible side-benefits on certain segments of the 
subjugated population. 
With regard to the first device, the Report of the Commission on Native 
Education warned that peace could not be preserved in South Africa unless 
Africans had tolerable conditions in the areas where they were forced to live.222 
This call to make the designated areas more habitable presented a formidable 
problem. When the Nationalists came to power, a shortage of at least 150,000 
housing units for Africans, alone, already existed.223 One study described the 
urban African population as being scattered about in shacks, basements, cellars, 
outbuildings, garages, dormitories and "undefined and possibly undefinable 
quarters."224 Another study described the coloured section of East London, 
Korsten, as "the worst slum in the world."225 
As a result of the recommendations of the Commission, the government 
enacted two Acts. First, the Black Building Workers Act226 authorized the train-
ing of African construction workers for projects to provide new and renovated 
buildings for use by members of their group. This Act established a system of 
technical and vocational schools for Africans. Second, the Native Services Levy 
Act227 provided a mechanism for financing construction projects. This Act 
221. See § III.B supra. 
222. REpORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO NATIVE EDUCATION [EISELEN COMMISSION], (Union 
Gov't Pub. No. 53/1951, 1951) [hereinafter cited as EISELEN COMMISSION]' 
223. SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, HANDBOOK ON RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
244 (E. Hellman ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as Hellman]. 
224. University of Natal, The African Factory Worker, in SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 198 (1954) [hereinafter cited as University of 
Natal]. 
225. Stocker, Slums and Housing Schemes, in AFRICA IN TRANSITION 90 (P. Smith ed. 1958) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Stocker]. 
226.' Black Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951, § 10. 
227. Native Services Levy Act, No. 64 of 1952, repeakd by Laws on Plural Relations and Development 
Act, No. 16 of 1979. 
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required all employers to pay a levy of two shillings and sixpence per week for 
each African employee not housed on the employers' premises,228 The money 
collected was then to be used by the government to cover the cost of providing 
water, sanitation, street lighting, road maintenance, and bond repayment for 
transport senices in black areas. 22 !J The Native Senices Levy Act also established 
a Natives Senices Committee to coordinate the activities of a nationwide network 
of local advisory committees which were to draw up proposals for their partiCll-
lar areas.230 
These measures spawned entirely new approaches to African urban-areas 
housing schemes. Many cities abandoned the traditional practice of simply de-
signating an area for African residence and allowing it to develop uncon-
trolled. 2 :1I Instead, cities made planning and community development efforts. 2 :l2 
Later, the Community Development Act2:l:l and the Housing Act234 enabled 
the national gm'ernment to prescribe population densities, boundary lines, 
proper zoning and housing construction standards. 2 :l5 The Community De-
velopment Act also enabled the national government to assume direct develop-
ment responsibility when the local advisory committees failed to operate ade-
quately.2:l6 These positive inducements have produced significant improvements 
in the quality of the urban em'ironment for many Ahicans. The government has 
provided good quality housing in the new designated areas and has eliminated 
the worst, although not all, of the slums.2:17 
In addition to the incentives provided by an improved quality of life, there are 
also side-benefits to individual members of the subjugated groups which secure 
their acquiescence in the system. Non-white construction workers benefit by 
228. Id. § 3. 
229. Id. §§ 5, 10(d). 
230. Id. § 7. 
231. For a description of the traditional system of uncontrolled development in African sections of 
urban areas see Hellman, supra note 223: University of Natal. supra note 224; Stocker. supra note 225; 
EISELEN COMMISSIOl\', supra note 222. For accounts of patterns of development in studies of specific 
areas see aLm D. READER. THE BLACKMAN'S PORTION (1961) (East London); UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
INSTITCTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, BAUMANVILLE (1959) (Durban); van Heerden. New Life jar a Dark Town, 
17 ]. OF RACIAL AFF. 7 (1966) Uohannesburg's Alexandra Township) [hereinafter cited as van 
Heerdenl: M. WILSO" &. A. MAFEJE, LANGA (1963) (Cape Town). 
232. The urban improvement programs a~d attempts to provide coordination and direction to 
development are described in Mocke. The Native Services Act BANTOE/BANTU, Feb. 1956, at 33; Heald, 
Urban Bantu Housing BANTOEIBANTC, june 1956, at 2; Veld, Housing, 14]. OF RACIAL AFF. 178 (1963); 
Moolman, The Resettlement of Urban Bantu in the Bantu Hmnelands, 15]. Of RACIAL AFF. 54 (1964); van 
Heerden supra note 231; Penny, Town Planning Urban Renewal and Economy, 36 S. AFR.]. OF ECON. 168 
(1968). 
233. Community Development Act, No. 69 of 1955, amended by Community Development Act, No.3 
of 1966. 
234. Housing Act, No. 10 of 1957. 
235. See Uf. §§ 42(1)(d)-(e). 81; Community Development Act. No.3 of 1966, §§ 27-28, 49. 
236. Community Development Act, No.3 of 1966, § 17. 
237. Sa note 232 supra. 
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obtaining employment. However, the non-white middle classes are the more 
significant beneficiaries. The Group Areas Act prohibits any person from own-
ing any immovable property in an area closed to his group.2:lK For the African 
group, elimination of white and Indian competition has meant the emergence of 
an entrepreneurial class.2:l9 Although they have lost many shops and small 
businesses under this system, the coloured and Indian groups have gained many 
new opportunities in manufacturing, retailing and banking.240 Coloured and 
Indian groups may also own their own homes. 241 As an additional incentive, 
since 1978. Africans have been able to acquire ninety-nine year leaseholds on 
land in their areas with full rights to ownership of improvements.242 Thus, tllr 
those individuals who receive better housing, for those who can own their own 
homes. fl», those who obtain positions in the racially stratified bureaucracy. and 
for those who secure protected retail markets, acquiescence in apartheid is easy. 
The gm'ernment encourages their acquiescence in apartheid by giving these 
individuals a stake in the system which oppresses them. 
C. Anti-Miscegenation Statutes 
1. Introduction 
The anti-miscegenation statutes are, on their face, regulative. 2 -l:l At a deeper 
level, however, they are primarily expressive because they articulate the extren~e 
repugnance of the Afrikaner (and the English speaking white South African) tllr 
interracial sexual intimacy. 
The Population Registration Act indirectly reduces the potential for cross-
racial affective ties. The Group Areas Act implicitly blocks formation of such ties 
by regulating residential patterns. But the anti-miscegenation statutes explicitly 
and directly prohibit interracial sexual intimacy. As in the other areas of racial 
238. Group Areas Act. No. 41 of 1950. § 4. 
239. Wilson. The Political Implication, jor Blacks of Economic Clwnges Noll' Taking Place in South Afrial, in 
CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA 168, 186-194 (L. Thompson & J. Butler eds. 1975). See 
REpORT OF THE COMMISSIOK OF INQL'IRY INTO LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE UTlLIZATIOl\' OF MAl\'POWER, 
(Republican Pub. No. 32/1979, 1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF MANPOWER]' See generally L. KUPER, 
AN AFRICAN BOURGOISIE: RACE, CLASS & POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1965) [hereinafter cited as KUPER]. 
240. REpORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO MATTERS RELATING TO THE C .. ,OLOURED Pop-
ULATION GROUPS, (Republican Pub. No. 38/1 976, 1976); Moodley, South African Indians: The Wavering 
Minority, in CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA 250 (L. Thompson & J. Butler eds. 1975). See also 
Rhoodie, s'"pra note 113. 
241. Boaden, The Urban Housing Problem in an Apartheid Economy, 77 AFR. AFF. 499 (1978). 
242. Gov't :r\otice No. RI036 of 1979. For a discussion of this notice, see SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF 
RACE RELATIONS, SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1979,401 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS]. By the Housing Amendment Act, African housing loans will be handled 
by the National Housmg Commission which had previously administered public housing finance onl) 
for whites, coloureds and Indians. Housing Amendment Act, No. 109 of 1979. 
243. The Population Registration Act is declaratory. See § V.A.I supra. The Residential Segregation 
statutes have a distributive function. See § V.B.I supra. 
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segregation,244 the Nationalists did not invent penalties for interracial sexual 
relations. However, the Nationalists significantly expanded the purview of such 
penalties. Thus, the statutes in this area are quite similar in their development to 
population registration and residential segregation. Once again, the pre-1948 
legal culture has had an emphatic impact on the implementation of social 
engineering. 
2. Development of the Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
Before formation of the Union of South Africa, in 1911, all four provinces245 
prohibited sexual intercourse between white women and African men.246 In 
1927, the Union Government passed the original Immorality Act.247 The Im-
morality Act made sexual intercourse between unmarried Europeans and Afri-
cans illegal.24H 
In the first decade after coming to power in 1948, the Nationalists moved to 
close the loopholes in the existing legislation. The Immorality Act applied only to 
non-marital relationships.249 Interracial sexual relations in a mixed marriage 
were, therefore, fully legal. Therefore, the Nationalists passed the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act250 which prevented future marriages between Europeans 
and non-Europeans. The Mixed Marriages Act not only nullifies such marriages, 
it also makes the individual performing the wedding ceremony subject to crimi-
nal prosecution and "liable to a fine not exceeding 50 pounds."251 Closing a 
loophole in the Mixed Marriages Act, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Amendment Act voids marriages performed outside of South Africa between 
male South African citizens and women of other racial groups.252 
The Nationalists also made an effcHt to punish those individuals who had 
already legally consummated interracial marriages. The Group Areas Act in-
cludes a proviso that a woman married to a member of another racial group 
244. See §§ V.A.I, B.I supra. 
245. See note 107 supra. 
246. One author points out the similarity between the extreme segregation practiced in South Africa 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the racism prevalent at that time in the 
American South. 
White civilization ... faced the prospect of being destroyed from within if it allowed itself to be 
associated with nonwhite races. The influence of the pseudoscience of eugenics, then very 
popular in the United States, led to fears of increased biological "contamination" through 
intermarriage with non-Aryans and the creation of a "mongoloid" race. 
Rich, The Origins of Apartheid Ideology: The Case of Ernest Stubbs and Transvaal Native Administration, 
(.1902-1932,79 AFR. AFF. 171, 176 (1980). 
247. Immorality Act, No.5 of 1927. 
248. Id. Sections 1-3 of the Immorality Act describe the prohibited acts of intercourse between 
Europeans and Natives; sections 4-6 describe the punishment. 
249. Id. § 7. 
250. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949. 
251. Id. § 2. 
252. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1968. 
\ 
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belongs to her husband's group.253 However, if the man were white, he would 
assume his wife's classification and his wife would retain her former status.254 
Therefore, a white man who marries outside his race faces the severe penalty of 
reclassification.255 A curious effect of the operation of these laws is that since a 
white person married to a non-white person ceases to be white, by official logic, 
sexual relations between a white and a non-white cannot occur within a mar-
riage. 
A second major loophole in the Immorality Act was the restriction of its scope 
to whites and Africans. In 1950, the Nationalists amended the Immorality Act to 
prohibit sexual intercourse between whites and coloured persons.256 "Coloured 
person" is defined, for purposes of the Amendment, as any person who is not a 
white person.257 The Nationalists again amended the Immorality Act in 1957258 
to outlaw all sexual contact between whites and non-whites and to make solicita-
tion (explicit or implied) to such contact subject to the same penalties as actual 
contact.259 
Although the miscegenation laws have been developed through several steps, 
the final version of the package of Acts is not historically unique. In fact, the 
South African court had already anticipated the Nationalist version of interracial 
sex laws in the dictum of an earlier opinion. In Moller v. Keimoes School Committee, 
Chief Justice Lord de Villiers of the Appellate Division recognized that the "first 
civilised legislators in South Africa ... [believed], as these Whites did, that 
intimacy with the black or yellow races would lower the Whites without raising 
the supposed inferior races in the scale of civilisation, [and thus] they con-
demned intermarriage or illicit intercourse between persons of the two races."260 
3. Enforcement of the Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
The anti-miscegenation statutes are among the most difficult apartheid laws to 
enforce. Unless individuals are caught in flagrante delicto or unless someone 
chooses to report an illicit solicitation, little likelihood of prosecution exists.261 
253. Black Laws Amendment Act. No. 77 of 1957, § 10(1)(b)(ii). 
Z54. !d. § lO(1)(b)(iii). 
255' •. !d. 
256. lmmorality Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1950. 
257. [d. § .3. 
258. Immorality Amendment Act, No. 23 of 1957. § 1. 
259. [d. §§ 2(a)(iii), I6(l)(a)(iii). 
260. Moller v. Keimos School Committee, [1911] App. Div. 635. 643. 
261. Of course, the police do conduct investigations based upon complaints from the public; but 
given the nature of the offense such investigations must resort to dubiolls tactics. The South African 
Institute of Race Relations reported that five police officers were guilty of trespass and searching 
without a warrant when they entered a white woman's apartment to investigate an immorality com-
plaint. SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS, supra note 242, at 23. 
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HO\\cver, the primary importance of the laws is their expressive function. These 
stat utes officially condemn intenacial sex and attach a sel'ere penalty to it. 262 
The Prohibition of Mixed Maniages Act is panicularly expressive. Even with-
out the Act, interracial marriages would probably be quite rare: The Immorality 
Act prohibits inteITacial sexual intercourse between unmarried individuals: the 
Population Regist ration Act makes one's associates a primary element in the 
classilication or reclassilication of an individual's racial group membership: and 
the Group Areas Act precludes interracial cohabitation. In fact, regardless of 
these legal factors, interracial marriage would be unlikely fClr whites simply 
because of the social stigma. Evidence shows that even belcne Parliament pro-
mulgated the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, mixed marriages were 
lI11Usual. \'all den Berghe repons, for example, that in 1946, only one white in 
714 (0.14'/') married outside his group and only 1.38% of all registered mar-
riages were racially exogamous.26 :l 
The transition from social to legal controls of miscegenation has been a 
long-term p)()cess. The l\ ationalists halc been primarily responsible for inten-
sih illg the legal controls. They have used the law both to articulate traditional 
l110res and to control social processes. The ~ationalists have broadened the kinds 
of sexual relationships which are f(nbidden by law and which are subject to 
,elere pellalties. 26 • Both the selerity of the penalties and the breadth of the 
forbidden conduct emphasi/.e the Nationalists' concern with preventing action 
\\'hich might undermille the racial stratification system. 
D. Thf PII.I.I Lllml 
I. lilt rod uct iOll 
Oil the surface, the Populatioll Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the 
allti-miscegenatioll laws are non-disCI'iminatory. They discriminate only in oper-
atioll. The Group Areas Act e\'en provides some benefits to the disadvantaged 
groups, which gives this legislation a relati\'ely benign l~lcade. The Pass Laws, on 
the other hand, offer no subtle benefits to soften the use of coercive power to 
keep white, black and broWll separate. The Pass Laws aim at maintaining th~/ 
racial hierarchy. These laws clearly demonstrate the power of the white regirl'.1e 
and the subjugatioll of the non-white masses. 
The Pass Laws lit into the general pattern of the apartheid social engit'teering 
program. The Pass Laws conform to the scheme of social reformatin,n through 
social fragmentatioll. As in the areas addressed abo\'e, this legislation has a 
262. Interracial sexual contact can result in seven years in prison plus a flogging. Immorality Act, No. 
23 of 1957, §§ 16,22. 
263. V A" DEN BERGH', supra note 55, at 55. 
264. S" § V.C.2 supm. 
/ 
.I 
/ 
I 
! 
/ 
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component directed at blocking the affective ties that might operate to break 
down the norms of interracial contact desired by the Nationalists. But these laws 
may be even more malevolent than the others. The Pass Laws go beyond simply 
expressing the inferiority of the non-white groups. These laws undermine (he 
potential of non-whites to achieve self-actualization and depersonalize the indi-
vidual. As a result of the Pass Laws, members of the subordinate groups see 
themselves almost exclusively in terms of group membership. Thus, the Pass 
Laws underpin and energize all the other laws which control interracial beha\'-
ioral patterns. 
2. De\'elopment of the Pass Law System 
As in the cases of the racial legislation discussed above, the Nationalists did not 
invent a new tool of subjugation with the Pass Laws. Rather, the Nationalists 
extended an existing system and adapted it to new circumstances. 
Vagrancy Laws of 1809 represent the initiation of the pass system in South 
Africa.2fio These laws required each non-slave, non-white to carry a permit when 
travelling from place to place. Although the Vagrancy Laws, themselves, became 
invalid in 1828,2fifi f(n almost all of South African history since 1809, the law has 
required African males to have passes from their home jurisdictions while in 
white areas. 2fi ' 
When the Nationalists came to power, a number of loopholes existed in the 
pass system. The system focused only on one racial group, the blacks, and it did 
not even fully encompass that group. The law did not require coloured persons 
or Indians to carry passes. Neither did it require these groups to obtain travel 
permits (although the law did oblige Indians to secure permission for interpro-
\'incial travel).2fiH African women were also exempt from pass requirements, 
except for transit from their tribal homelands to destinations in the white 
areas.2fi9 Later, male members of the nascent African middle class, those with 
European educations, and those in professional occupations could acquire letters 
265. See THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 280-81 (A. Newton, E. Benians, E. Walker 
eds. 1936) [hereinafter cited as CAMBRIDGE HISTORY]. 
266. CAPE COLONY, XXXIV RECORDS OF THE CAPE COLONY, Ordinance 50 (1828). For commentary 
on this ordinance, see CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 265, at 290. 
267. Since 1809, the various South African Pass Laws have operated as a substitute for the slave 
trade, which the British disallowed. See notes I and 171 supra. "As landless men, bound by the pass 
system to work where they dwelt, [non-whites] had no opportunity of improving their lot and thereby 
addled] to the prosperity of ... [Cape] Colony." WALKER, supra note 57, at 169. See generally BALLINGER, 
supra note 2. 
268. Admission of Persons to the Union Act, No. 22 of 1913. 
269. Natives' (Urban Areas) Act, No. 25 of 1930. Section 7 required native females to have authoriza-
tion to travel to cities. Section 19 authorized municipal authorities to require native men and women to 
have written permits during night hours. [d. 
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of exemption for the pass requirements.27o The provinces of the Natal and the 
Cape of Good Hope allowed these so-called "civilized" Africans nearly complete 
freedom of movement. 271 
In 1952, the Nationalists moved to close up the loopholes in the pass system. 
The Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act272 provides 
that every native, resident alien and foreign contract worker must obtain a 
reference book upon reaching the age of sixteen. 273 In the front of the book is an 
identity card issued by the census bureau.274 The card contains all the informa-
tion recorded in the Population Register275 along with the holder's current 
address. 276 The holder must obtain validations by his employers in his reference 
book to prove that he has the right to be where he is or to do what he is doing. 277 
The Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act provides 
that failure to produce the reference book on the demand of a responsible 
official or policeman subjects an individual to a fine of up to ten pounds and/or 
up to 30 days in jail.27R If such an individual is in a white area illegally, he is 
subject to repatriation to his tribal area279 and a fine of R 100280 or 90 days 
imprisonment. 
In general, South African criminal procedure with regard to arrest power is 
similar to that of common law countries. The Criminal Procedure Act281 pro-
vides for arrest on warrants issued by a judge or magistrate upon affidavit of a 
police officer or prosecutor. An officer may also make an arrest without warrant 
when an offense occurs in the presence of the officer or if he has probable cause 
to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act, however, allows a police officer, without a warrant, to arrest 
270. Exemption in Cape Colony was de facto. After formation of the Union of South Africa, the 
government extended the policy to the Transvaal. See Hellman, supra note 223, at 282. It later became a 
national policy. Natives' (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923, § 12(2)(a). 
271. KUPER, supra note 239, at 92. 
272. Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, No. 67 of 1952. 
273. [d. § 2. 
274. Population Registration Amendment Act, No. 29 of 1970, § 6. 
275. The Population Registration Act provides for the compilation of a Register of Population of the 
Union by the Director of Census. It also provides for the issuance of identification cards to persons 
whose names are included in the Register. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, § 2. 
276. Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, No. 67 of 1952, § 2. 
277. [d. § 10(4). 
278. !d. § 15. 
279. Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act provides that no Black may remain in 
an urban area for more than seventy-two hours unless either he or she: (I) has resided in the area 
continuously since birth; (2) has worked in the area continuously for the same employer for ten years; (3) 
has resided in the area continuously for fifteen years; (4) is the wife, unmarried daughter, or son under 
tax paying age of someone covered by 1,2, or 3 above; or, (5) has a special permit. Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, amended by Black Laws Amendment Act, No. 36 of 1957, § 30a and 
Black Laws Amendment Act, No. 42 of 1964, § 47a. 
280. I Rand = approximately $1.l5 U.S. 
281. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977. 
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any African in an urban area, if the officer has reason to believe that the African 
is an idle or undesirable person.2H2 Accordingly, police execute routine pass raids 
in which the police round up Africans to check the individual's pass for valida-
tion of his right to be in a particular area.283 The Criminal Procedure Act 
provides further that police officers may enter and search any premises where 
illegal Africans may be domiciled or employed.2H4 The law, therefore, does not 
restrict raids to Africans on the street. 
3. The Impact of Court Decisions on the Pass Laws 
The courts have had little impact on limiting the operation of the Pass Laws. 
Just as the high court upheld discrimination in public facilities if authorized by 
Pariiament,2H5 it has stated that Parliament may impose the burden of proof on 
the defendant in a criminal trial. 2H6 When the court attempted to mitigate the 
pernicious effects of the Pass Laws, the government instituted legislation which 
limited the court's power to do so. 
When, in the area of search and seizure, the court took a narrow view of the 
police right to enter private premises,287 the government promptly enacted the 
Criminal Procedure Act. 288 This Act allows a police officer to enter any premises 
without a warrant when he has reasonable grounds to suspect that any offense is 
being committed, is about to be committed, or is being prepared to be commit-
ted. 2H9 
4. The Results of Enforcement of the Pass Laws 
The result of all the legal latitude given to the police In enforcing the Pass 
Laws is that, unlike the Immorality Act, the Pass Laws are vigorously enforced. 
Police make frequent sweeps through African residential areas and work sites to 
check documents.29o Between 1966 and 1975, the government, under the Na-
282. Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, § 29. 
283. The year 1979 was characterized by an increase in the number of such raids. The public 
reported many complaints about "extreme arrogance, obstructiveness and authoritarianism" displayed 
by the authorities. SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS, supra note 242, at 391. 
284. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977, § 25. 
285. See note 90 supra. 
286. Rex v. Ndhlovu, [1945] App. Div. 369. 
287. Wolpe v. Officer Commanding South African Police, Johannesburg, [1955] 2 S.A. 87 (Witwa-
tersrand Local Div.). 
288. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 56 of 1955. 
289. /d. § 44. 
290. The concern for internal national security has forced the South African government to even 
further extremes since 1948. 
With mounting unrest among Africans, military and police control becomes increasingly 
crucial. The older nonwhite shanty-towns with their maze of narrow, tortuous alleys were often 
located close to white residential or business districts; [in the 1960's they were] ... systemat-
ically being razed as a major military hazard. They [were] ... replaced with "model townships" 
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Activity 
Arrests and Summons 
Patrol and Police Checks 
Prosecution 
Loss of Prod uction 
Imprisonment 
Issuing and Cpdating Documents 
Labour Bureau 
Aid Centres 
Transit Camps 
Total 
*One Rand = U.S. $1.15 
TABLE 2 
COSTS OF E:\FORCIKG PASS LAWS 
[Vol. V, No. I 
Cost in Rand* 
1,150,116 
11,501,160 
1,714,526 
7,667,445 
18,749,312 
24,051,568 
47,160,000 
331,110 
500,000 
112,825,237 
SOUl'ce: M. Savage. CO.lt.1 of En/lilTing AjJartheid and Problems afChange, 76 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 287 (1976). 
tionalisl reglmc, pursued nearly 5.8 million prosecutions of Africans for viola-
tions of thc various statutes related to the pass system - an average of approxi-
match 1154 prosecutions pel' day.2"t According to a conservative estimate, 
cnf()lccment of thc Pass Laws costs about R 112,825,237 (U .S. $129,749,023) per 
\ear.2HZ 
In South Africa, every adult member of the society must have an identity card 
to plOve his identity.2":1 L'nlike identification cards which exist in other countries, 
thc South African identity cards prove identity to the persons who hold them as 
I\Tll as to those who ask Ir)]' them. The problem is especially acute f(lr Africans. 
"Vhites, coloureds and Indians must produce their identity cards and supporting 
documentation to a magistrate within seven days upon demand by a govcrnment 
official,2'" Africans must have their passes in their possession at all times.""" If an 
African does not have his pass when confronted by the police, he is subject to 
arrest and imprisonment or to repatriation to his tribal homelancJ.2"" 
A good exam pic of the extent to which the Pass Laws have accomplished the 
cieperstll1aIi/ation neccssary to structure inteITacial interaction is trJlmci in an 
with unobstructed, rectilinear tields of tire, and ,\Tide streets for the passage of police vans and 
armoured cars. The ne'v ghettos are typically situated several miles from the white towns, \vith 
a buffer zone in between: they are sprinkled with strategically located police stations, and often 
enclosed by ba rhed ,vi re. 
Degrpe.1 and Kinds, sUjJra note 62, at 39-40. See a/so Frankel, The Politin of Passes: Control and Change in 
South A/iiea, 17 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 199 (1979); Frankel, South A/iiw: The Politirs oj Police Control, 12 
COMPo POI.. 481 (1980). 
291. Savage. Costs 0/ Fn/rncing Aportheid and Problems of Change, 76 AFR. AFF. 287, 295 (1977). 
292. See table II m/ia. 
293. Population Registration Art, 1\0. 30 of 1950. 
294. fd. § 13. 
:29.:'). Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, No. 67 of 1952, § 13. 
296. fri. § 15. 
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account by an African journalist, Lewis Nkosi, of the deaths of two Soweto men. 
The men had died when they crawled into a burning building to rescue their 
reference boob. 
It is not heroism - and nothing like bra\'ado - that can make a man 
go to his death in an attempt to save a Pass Book. 
The moti\'e is simply FEAR - the realisation of what life will be 
worth without a reference book. 
For a reference book has ceased to be a mere form of identification. 
It is interchangeable with the man himself. 
I do not li\'e apart from my own reference book any more. In fact, I 
have decided I AM THE REFERENCE BOOK.297 
In his identity card or passbook, every South African has a constant reminder 
that his place in society depends on his racial classification. Therefore, he finds 
his classification to be the most important aspect of his social life. The Pass Laws 
cut individuals off from their own selves. People subject to the Pass Laws act, 
think and feel, not as autonomous human beings, but as components of their 
officially and legally defined racial groups within the racial heirarchy. Thus, the 
pass system solidifies the structure of the entire apartheid system of gO\ernment. 
VI. RECE:\T DE\'ELOPMENTS 1:\ THE PROGRAM 
A. Political Development.1 
Recent events in South Africa emphasize the salient position of the laws 
regulating interpersonal interracial contact under the l'\ational Party regime. On 
September 29. 1978, Defense Minister P. W. Botha became the fifth National 
Party Prime Minister. 29H Within a year, many black leaders and the English 
language opposition press were hailing him as a champion of reform. Following 
a ten-day visit by Mr. Botha to the black homelands and Soweto (the black suburb 
of Johannesburg), the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr. Cedric Phatudi commented 
that "the winds of change are now blowing ill the right direction."299 Qwa Qwa 
Chief Minister, T.K. Mopeli, congratulated the Prime Minister for setting out a 
new direction for ethnic relations and for his "determination to create a better 
South Africa f(n its different peoples.":lOO By November of 1979, Botha had 
accomplished the pre\ious\Y unthinkable feat of having a majority (57o/c) of the 
urban black population record a positive evaluation of his leadership of the 
country, whereas his predecessor had only received positive ratings of 4 to 6o/c 
297. Golden City Post, Feb. 22. 1959, at I. cited in KCPER. wpm note 239. at 62. 
298. Sf{ POLITICAL HA>lDBOOK, ,upra note 107, at 392. 
299. The Citizen, Sept. 25, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3, col. I (Sept. 2R, 1979). 
300. Id. 
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from the same group. A near majority of the urban black population (49%) even 
recorded a positive evaluation of his handling of race relations. Furthermore, 
Botha was able to secure this increased black support without significant loss of 
white support.301 
Mr. Botha had won these plaudits as a result of statements by himself, his 
cabinet and the state president. In his first public statement, in June of 1979, the 
new state president302 said that South Africa would bring justice to its oppressed 
minorities and would devise a formula to provide democratic rights to all of the 
country's minorities.303 The Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr. Piet 
Koornhof, speaking to the National Press Club of America in Washington, D.C. 
declared that a new era of reform had dawned in South Africa in which real 
changes would take place to end discriminatory practices and policies.304 Later, 
back in South Africa, Koornhof opened the annual conference of the National 
African Federation of Chambers of Commerce by saying that he believed in 
equality before the law, full human rights, and full participation in decision 
making in a government set up for everyone, regardless of race. 305 Similarly, the 
Minister of Finance, Senator Owen Horwood, stated, in a speech in Antwerp, 
that the government intended to eliminate discrimination on the basis of 
color.:lOH 
Mr. Botha, himself, played the leading role in raising hopes for change. He 
told an interviewer in Die Transmaler that South Africa had to either adjust or 
die, and that although he had been put into office by the whites, he also 
recognized his responsibility to the other racial groupS.:107 Shortly thereafter, 
Botha presented a twelve-point plan of principles for his government.30H Among 
the principles he presented were the acceptance of a multi-racial society, the 
acceptance of minority rights, the greatest possible consolidation of the black 
homelands, a division of power including consultation on matters of common 
concern, and the elimination of unnecessary discrimination. During his tour of 
the homelands and Soweto, Botha indicated that he was willing to accept a status 
for urban blacks which would be independent of the homelandsyo9 In Sep-
tember 1979, he told the Cape National Party Youth Congress that a policy 
where one group rules over another was fruitless and had become extinct.3lO 
301. Markinor Survey, The Star, Nov. 29, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 8 (Dec. 7, 1979). 
302. Mavais Viljoen was the state president. 
303. New State President, [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3, col. 3 (June 22, 1979). 
304. Pretoria News, June 17, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 5, col. I (June 22, 1979). 
305. Rand Daily Mail, July 6, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3, col. I (July 13, 1979). 
306. Rand Daily Mail, July I, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3, col. I (July 6, 1979). 
307. Die Transvaler, Aug. 8, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. I, col. 2 (Aug. 10, 1979). 
308. The Twelve Point Programme was presented to the Natal Congress of the National Party on 
Aug. 15, 1979. Premwr Spells Out Planfor Republic's Future, [1979] S. AFR. DIG. I, col. 2 (Aug. 24,1979) 
[hereinafier cited as Republic's Future]. 
309. Die Burger, Aug. 13, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 21, col. I (Aug. 17, 1979). 
310. Die Burger, Sept. 25, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3 (Sept. 28, 1979). 
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In his advocacy of a new dispensation for the non-white groups, Mr. Botha 
had been strongly influenced by South African military opinion. In his previous 
capacity as Minister of Defense, Botha had close relations with leaders of the 
military complex.311 Significantly, government members and military leaders 
were espousing change at the same time. In August 1979, Brigadier C.J. Loyd of 
the Natal Command commented that the government of South Africa needed to 
give its military a country which it could feel proud to defend and that force 
could not provide a lasting solution for internal problems.312 Loyd's superior, 
General Magnus Malan, was even more blunt. Malan said that it was of strategic 
importance to gain the trust and faith of all the population and that this would 
require moving away from discrimination.313 
B. Substantive Development 
I. Separating Politics from Substance 
In spite of the statements by members of the government and the military, 
little substantive change in the interracial contact laws has occurred. One must 
question whether any prospect of such change in the immediate future exists. 
When the new session of Parliament opened in February 1980, the state presi-
dent announced that the government was committed to a decade of reform, 
renewal and development.314 Mr. Botha had raised hopes about his being a 
reformist prime minister, committed to new constitutional proposals, homeland 
consolidation, narrowing the wage gap between white and black, and improving 
the life of the urban black. At the same time, Botha indicated that he had to 
protect the identity of his people, the very policy which originally had motivated 
implementation of the apartheid program. 
For some observers, this apparent turnabout was a cruel blow to hopes for an 
improved racial climate. The Cape Times, in an editorial, complained that public 
expectations raised in 1979 would not be realized.315 The Argus lamented that 
those South Africans looking forward to changes designed to diminish racial 
tensions would be disappointed.316 Mr. Vause Raw, leader of the New Republic 
Party, told Parliament that, after eighteen months of promises of a new dispensa-
tion, the Botha book had no more than a title, a prologue and blank pages.317 
311. Botha had been Minister of Defense since 1966. 
312. Sunday Tribune. Aug. 12. 1979. reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 20. col. 3 (Aug. 17. 1979). 
313. Pretoria News, June 20, 1979. reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3. col. 1 Uune 22. 1979). 
314. Sunday Tribune. Feb. 3. 1980. reprinted in [1980] S. AFR. DIG. 24. col. 3 (Feb. 8, 1980). 
315. Cape Times. Feb. 7, 1980. reprinted in [1980] S. AFR. DIG. 25. col. 1 (Feb. 15. 1980). 
316. The Argus. Feb. 7. 1980. reprinli!d in [1980] S. AFR. DIG. 23. col. 3 (Feb. 15. 1980). 
317. The no confidence debate of February 4,1980 is discussed in Decade of Reform [1980] S. AFR. 
DIG. 3, col. 2 (Feb. 8. 1980). Realistically. no one should have been surprised at the course of events. 
Botha had based his springtime of hope on wishful thinking. Botha's change in perception was quite 
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2. The Question of Real Change 
On May 8, 1979, Parliament discussed the Report of the Riekert Commission 
of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting Utilisation of Manpower.3 IH The report 
recommended extensive changes in the pass system. The report recommended, 
for example, the elimination of the influx control measure limiting African 
work-seekers to a seventy-two hour stay in an urban area and elimination of the 
criminal penalties for unlawfully working in an urban area.:!19 Minister of Coop-
eration and Development Koornhof announced that the influx control and 
reference book system would be made more humane.:12o Parliament, however, 
refused to accept the recommended changes in the system.:121 Not only did 
Parliament reject the recommendation to eliminate criminal penalties for illegal 
black workers, but it introduced heavy new penalties (R 500 minimum fine)322 
for employers of illegal workers.:l2:! In his speech to the National Press Club of 
America, in which he proclaimed a new era of reform, Minister Koornhof stated 
that influx controls actually helped blacks.:12~ Koornhof announced later that 
passes would be eliminated and replaced by documents, similar to those used by 
the other groups, which were more convenient to carry.325 
With regard to the anti-miscegenation laws, a pattern similar to that of the pass 
system became evident. In September of 1979, Mr. Botha told the National Party 
Congress in Cape Town that he would not tolerate laws that insult people.326 He 
stated that although mixed maITiages are inherently undesirable, preventing 
people in love from marrying is difficult. Botha also stated that although the 
Immorality Act was open to some criticism, any immorality had to be opposed.327 
Thus, he favored imprO\'ement in the acts, but preservation of important values. 
In the area of residential segregation, the government made some improve-
ment. Mr. Botha's visit to Soweto in August 1979 was the first official recognition 
by a National Party prime minister of the urban black population as a political 
different than that of the non-whites, the English press and the opposition. Throughout the initial 
year-and-a-half of his term as prime minister, Botha and his cabinet always hedged their pronounce-
ments of change. With regard to each of the four areas of social engineering legislation, the Botha 
government either circumscribed any apparent amelioration of the legislation's deleterious impact on 
non-whites, or merely extended the Nationalist's previous policy. 
318. REpORT OF MANPOWER, supra note 239. 
319. SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS, supra note 242, at 394-95. 
320. Pretoria News, May 8, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 4, col. 2 (May II, 1979). 
321. See WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AFFECTING 
THE UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER (1979), discussed in SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS, supra note 242, at 
202-19, 232-34, 237, 259, 386-98, 402-44, 527. 
322. See note 280 supra. 
323. Laws on Plural Relations and Development Second Amendment Act, No. 98 of 1979. For 
commentary on this act, see SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS, supra note 242, at 391. 
324. See note 304 and accompanying text supra. 
325. Rand Daily Mail, Feb. 19, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 21, col. I (Feb. 23, 1979). 
326. Rand Daily Mail, Sept. 26, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 3, col. I (Sept. 28, 1979). 
327. Jd. 
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entity. Botha went so Llr as to say that he saw a place for the urban blacks in tlte 
constellation of southern African states independent of the homelands.;l2K Dr. 
Koornhof. a short time later, told a banquet for South Africa's top one hundred 
companies, that the government would turn over the whole gamut of profes-
sional. technical and administrative positions required to run a big city to Afri-
cans in order to bring decision-making and decision-implementing power to 
Soweto.;l2,. I n December 1979, the Minister of Community Development, Marais 
Steyn, announced that the Government had decided to stop building small 
square box-type housing fe)}' blacks and would, instead, construct the same type 
of housing fe)}' all racial groups.a;lO The gO\'ernment also took steps to improve 
commercial life for non-whites. Probably as a result of the Riekert Commission 
study, the gO\ernment decided to allow local authorities to open central business 
districts to Indian and colored traders.;\;lI The government also allowed white 
businessmen to enter into minority shareholding partnerships with Africans in 
the black areas in order to improve African access to capital.;l;l2 
The government has initiated some measures which are of benefit to the 
non-white groups. Community opposition prevented elimination of the black 
area of Alexandra.;l;l;l The government announced that the traditionally colored 
community of Sir Lowry's Pass, which had been f(JI'merly proclaimed a white 
area would be reclassified as a colored area, thus relieving the city's two thousand 
citizens of ten ,ears of apprehension.a;q The government has also allowed 
Chinese, although still fe)}'mally subject to coloured status, to buy homes in white 
areas if the white residents do not object.;l;\c, For the most part, however, the 
changes which occurred were pragmatic adjustments rather than substantive 
alteration of social policy. 
The concessions on Alexandra and Sir Lowry's Pass were the result of ad hoc 
Afrikaner effe)}'ts. For instance, the regime revealed the change in Chinese 
residential policy only after South Africa and the Republic of China had signed 
an R 400 million;l;w six-year uranium purchase plan agreement in March 
328. Die Burger, Aug. 13, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 21, col. 1 (Aug. 17, 1979). 
329. Rand Daily Mail, r-.;m'. 19, 1979. reprinted in [19791 S. AFR. OIl:. 5, col. 1 (Nov. 23, 1979). 
330. Sunday Tribune, Dec. I, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. A FR. 0,,:. 19, col. 2 (Dec. i, 1979). 
331. Under Section 19 of the Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966, eight such areas have been 
authorized. ANNGAL REpORT OF THE SECRETARY FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Republican Pub. No. 
2411979, 1979). The allocation of those areas is as follows: in Cape Province - Port Elizabeth, East 
London, Vryburg; in Transvaal - Pretoria, Roodesporl; in Natal- Newcastle, Ladysmith, Pinetown. 
[d. 
332. SURVEY of RACE REI.ATIO:'\lS, supra note 242, at 248. 
333. [d. at 418-20. 
334. [d. at 477-7R. Press reports indicate a government intention to retract the "white" designations 
of the traditionally Indian Pageview area of Johannesburg and the traditionally coloured District Six in 
Cape Town. See Sunday Times, Sept. 20, 1981, reprinted in [1981] S. AFR. DIG. 7 (Sept. 25, 1981). 
335. Beeld, Mar. 17, 1980, reprinted in [1980] S. AFR. DIG. 27, col. 3 (Mar. 21, 1980). 
336. See note 280 supra. 
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1980.';:)7 Opening central business districts to Indians was, at least partially, a 
legitimization of the numerous Indian-owned firms fronted by whites. 33H Turn-
ing O\'er municipal administrathe posts in African locations to blacks, introduc-
ing ninety-nine year leaseholds in the African locations, improving access to 
capital for African traders and designing more attractive housing, all fall within 
the policy of partial com pensation inducements for segregation. But as The Star 
commented in an editorial, the real problem confronting Soweto is unemploy-
ment and desperation.'l;l~ City status alone makes little difference. Soweto's real 
problems are that it has no tax base, no freehold property owners, no industry, 
IlO central business district. and a tremendous need for subsidization of trans-
port ."10 
The situation with regard to the anti-miscegenation and pass laws is far less 
ambiguous. Although Mr. Botha has expressed concern with removing unneces-
sary discrimination. his perception of "unnecessary" is narrowY41 His underlying 
premise is still that Afrikaner identity must be protected and preserved. Thus, 
the government may improve group areas but it has no intention to eliminate 
them. Similarly, the Prime Minister has said that he wants to improve the 
Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts. 342 Mr. Koornhof said the Pass Laws 
would be made more humane.;l4" But the Daily News rightly asks: "How does one 
improve something as bad as this?""4! 
In spite of some loosening of controls in the system, the apartheid program 
remains intact. The Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the 
Pass Laws are likely to remain essentially unchanged because they contribute 
direct II' to the main tenance of the power position of the Afrikaner. Much less 
vital to this power position are the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the 
Immorality Act. The i\'ationalists can probably achicve the purpose of both of 
these acts through social pressure and the operational effect of the Group Areas 
Act. However, the Nationalists are also unlikely to abolish these acts, pointing up 
the extreme importance which the Nationalists place on manipulation of social 
processes. The Afrikaner newspaper, Die Volksblad, identified the core issue 
when it said that the Government could not eliminate the Acts because the Acts 
really are "more of a protective than a discriminatory nature."345 
337. The Star, June 6, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 5, col. 2 Uune 6, 1979). 
33H. See Republic's Future, supra note 308. 
339. The Star, Sept. 3, 1979, reprinted in 11979] S. AFR. DIG. 21, col. 2 (Sept. 8, 1979). 
340. Id. 
341. See Republic's Future, supra note 308, point 6. 
342. See note 326 and accompanying text supra. 
343. See note 320 and accompanying text supra. 
344. Daily News, Feb. 14, 1980, reprinted in [1980] S. AFR. DIG. 26, col. 3 (Feb. 22, 1980). 
345. Die Volksblod, Sept. 27, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 22, col. 3 (Oct. 5, 1979). The 
Afrikaner paper Hoofstad found the plight of Mrs. Susan Green a cause for wncern with respect to the 
need for flexibility in race classification decision-making. Mrs. Green was forty-six years old when she 
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The present Government is definitely not in the process of dismantling apart-
heid. The opposition reacted in the 1980 opening of Parliament with bitter 
discontent, but such disappointment should have been anticipated. As the Cape 
Tirne~ had stated a year earlier, Mr. Botha's proposed reforms remained well 
within the Verwoerdian ideology.346 Nationalist supporters had believed all 
along that the government was fine-tuning the essential infrastructure of the 
socio-legal system, but not substantially altering it. As the Afrikaans paper, 
Rapport, noted in October 1979, Mr. Botha was stressing elimination of sticky 
points, not abandoning National Party tenets, in order to create a climate for 
more interracial cooperation.347 After all, Mr. Botha had, himself, said during 
the peak of his national popularity, that South Africa had to adapt and adjust or 
otherwise die.:14H He added that his government would work out a plan for 
adapting without changing the National Party's basic principles. 349 The Prime 
Minister's twelve point plan was "not so much a blueprint for the next decade as 
a rewriting in present day parlance of the aims and policy goals of the National 
Government."350 
In spite of the talk of change and reform following Mr. Botha's assumption of 
the premiership in September 1978, the legal complex supporting the apartheid 
program remains intact. The prospects are that it will continue its present form. 
decided to remarry. When she and her fiance applied for a marriage license, they found that the 
government had changed her racial status from white to coloured two years earlier. She had two 
children in white schools and a daughter married to a white man. The paper lamented that little could 
be done about Mrs. Green's case. It noted that the case demonstrated the need for better administrative 
procedure and more careful decision-making. Hoofstad, Feb. 16, 1980, reprinted in [1980] S. AFR. DIG. 
26, col. 3 (Feb. 22, 1980). 
346. Cape Times, Feb. 9, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 2, col. 1 (Feb. 16, 1979). From the 
beginning and continuously, Verwoerd's ideal was total separation of the races. To him and other 
National Party leaders, however, this was an impractical ideal for the prevailing circumstances. 
In his earliest speeches in Parliament, he repudiated the Opposition's contention that his 
interpretation of apartheid ... meant ... the fragmentation of South Africa both economically 
and politically. He denied forcefully that it implied the creation of autonomous states with 
power to enter into hostile alliances against White South Africa if they wished to do so, and 
with independent economies to support them, which the sincere apostles of apartheid would 
have to help them create, involving inevitably an implicit threat to the "White" community, 
Neither he nor his Party had ever suggested anything that could justify this contention. He had 
indeed [said] ... that "in their own areas" the Bantu might develop to the highest degree of 
self-government, but he went on to explain that this was local self-government. ... On the 
subject of international relations, [Verwoerd later stated that] ... the white man would not only 
enjoy supremacy in his own part of the country, but also "as trustee in respect of the outside 
world and of the interests of South Africa as a whole." 
BALLINGER, .>upra note 2, at 3 I 9-20. 
After he became Prime Minister in 1959, Verwoerd did commit himself to the possibility of ultimate 
African independence, "no doubt under the necessity to justify his decision to abolish all African 
representation in Parliament, and under pressure of events in the world outside." Id. at 321. History has 
shown that he never took this commitment seriously. See generally Uf. at 318-33. 
347. Rapport, Oct. 7, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 22, col. 1 (Oct. 12, 1979). 
348. Die Transvaler, Aug. 8. 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 1, col. 2 (Aug. 16, 1979). 
349. [d. 
350. Beeld, Aug. 17, 1979, reprinted in [1979] S. AFR. DIG. 21, col. I (Aug. 24, 1979). 
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The Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act are the basis of the 
regime's claim to the allegiance of the Afrikaner population. The government 
may loosen the Pass Laws but the government will not eliminate these laws 
because they are necessary for upholding the Group Areas Act. Of all the basic 
apartheid legislation, the anti-miscegenation laws are discardable since these laws 
are the least vital to the system. However, even the anti-miscegenation laws have 
an important symbolic function. Therefore, any alteration will be gradual, if at 
all. 
VII. CONCLlISION 
The Republic of South Africa has used law as a tool of social engineering and 
as a mechanism to preserve a stratified society. Although neither use is 
unique,:l51 the South African case is especially noteworthy because of the exten-
sive use of legal sanctions in its social engineering programs. 
Most studies of law and social change:l52 attempt to relate either one piece of 
legislation, one court decision or one judicial doctrine to subsequent social 
effects. Examination of the apartheid program in South Africa demonstrates the 
limitations of such an approach. The social engineering process is effected by the 
interaction of several complex factors, and no one factor, examined in isolation, 
can fully explain the dynamics of this process. 
The South African experience demonstrates, in particular, the paramount 
role played by the legal culture in any attempt to use law to effect social change. 
Research, in the West, for example, has shown that direct efforts to reduce 
discrimination lead to long-term reduction of prejudice. This result is attributa-
ble to a process similar to cognitive dissonance in that "[c]oncrete conditions 
produced through the laws' implementation may, over time, lead to changes in 
personal attitudes."""3 A similar process of dissonance reduction exists in South 
Africa. 
In both the United States and in South Africa, however, a second, more critical 
factor is also at work: in both countries a normative basis underlies the program 
of legal social engineering. The law effects social change not only th rough direct 
implementation (i.e., through enforcement), but also through an "educative 
function, reinforcing the norm of equality [or inequality]."354 The putative 
Sllccess of anti-discrimination laws on social change in the United States depends 
351. Dwyer, Law, Actual and Perceived: The Sexual Politics of Law in Morocco, 13 L. & SOC'Y REv. 73!J, 
742 (1979). Legal sanctions have also been applied to women in Morocco. A recent study of these 
sannions fourl'ti that "subordination, seclusion, surveillance and ideological denigration join in forming 
a web of limitations that curtail women's life options." This observation is analogous to the life of 
non-whites in the South African case. ld. 
352. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra. 
353. E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 137 (1968). 
354. [d. 
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upon the historical existence of the norm of equality. Whereas Americans may 
have had legal support for racial discrimination and even for sla\'ery, the pre-
dominant value system of the nation supported equality.305 In fact, the struggle 
to eliminate legitimized racial discrimination is probably the longest running 
political issue in the Cnited States, dating back to the Constitutional Convention 
itself. 
On the other hand, in South Africa, the \'alue system of the dominant interests 
in society has always sanctioned inequality. The Afrikaners looked back over one 
hundred and fifty years of British rule and saw a steady erosion of the social 
\'alues they cherished. The reality of social life was such, however, that "liberal" 
policy on racial issues failed to penetrate popular consciousness. 
In South Africa, the se\'enteenth century Cape society established a set of 
norms for interracial interaction. The legal system which developed between 
1806 and 1948 was manifestly an extention of the two great European legal 
traditions: common law and civil law . However, neither tradition was sufficiently 
rooted in the local milieu to afford resistance to the National Party's social policy. 
As a result, the pre-Nationalist legal culture was compatible with the apartheid 
program. 
When the r\ ational Party came to power in South Africa in 1948, it rep-
resented the organized expression of Afrikaner nationalism. The National Party 
preser\'ed Afrikaner identity through ethnic solidarity and ethnic mobilization, 
and it used public power to shape society according to social ideals passed from 
many Afrikaner generations. Although the legal system was based formally on 
the principles inherited from English common law and Roman-Dutch civil law, 
such as equality before the law, due process of law and judicial protection of 
individual rights, several well-established principles of the South African legal 
culture were also important ingredients. Among these principles were that the 
courts would not interfere in discriminatory practices sanctioned by Parliament, 
that the courts would decide ultra vires questions on the side of the executive, 
that white popular opinion on race questions would inform judicial interpreta-
tions of ambiguous race legislation, and that South African courts would not sit 
as courts of equity. The National Party's platform represented a promise to the 
Afrikaner that he would regain his rightful preeminence in society.356 The law 
would be the keystone of the efti)l"t to fulfill that promise. 
Therefore, the Nationalists could proscribe political actions against the re-
gime, remove the formal legal protections for violators of the proscriptions, and 
355. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, bk. II, ch. 1 (G. Lawerence trans. 1966). 
356. The reader should not take the emphasis on Afrikaner social ideals and the role of the National 
Party as vanguard of Afrikanerdom to mean that legalized racism is not accepted by the English-
speaking White South Africans. English speakers. for the most part, accept White domination and 
accept most social aspects of segregation. The Nationalists produced the development of a coherent 
program of rigid racially-based social controls on the basis of traditional Afrikaner values. 
50 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. V, No. I 
develop a legal framework for racial subjugation that would service the reestab-
lishment of the idealized social order. The formal commitment to western tenets 
of legalism might interfere, from time to time, with the l\' ational Party's program 
and individual judges might persist in ruling in fava/em libertalis. :l57 But on the 
whole, the system has allowed the government to secure whatever it desires in 
the legal sphere. As a re~ult, the South African experiment in manipulation of 
social processes through use of the legal sanction is one of the clearest examples 
of the potential effectiveness of law as a tool of social engineering. 
Scholars consider the concept of law as a tool of social engineering to be a 
ubiquitous feature of modern politics; but systematic knowledge of the operation 
of this concept to date has been deficient.:l5H In spite of the apparent failure of a 
specific piece of legislation to directly produce a desired outcome, law is an 
important component of a successful social engineering process. The continuing 
process of promulgation and enforcement of various laws produces social 
change. Each new piece of legislation adds to the perception that state interven-
tion into social processes is legitimate. 
The social engineering program in South Africa does not follow the concept of 
social engineering proposed by other studies. The program clearly does not aim 
at achieving the highest values of Western civilization."'" It is not primarily 
concerned with changing customary behavior.:l HO The National Party did not 
design the program to demonstrate official regard f(lI' popular conceptions of 
justice,,,.,1 nor to reduce behavior that might break down community integrity.!]"2 
The system is founded precisely on the premise that the society is a constellation 
of diverse communities. The social engineering program in South Africa uses 
law to shape the meaning structure of social life. If social engineering is to have 
any utility as a broad concept in comparative law scholars must view the concept 
as a method to impose meaning structures on social processes. The South 
African case proves this point. 
357. The courts have generally interpreted the law in favor of the executive \-vhen the law is 
ambiguous. In some Lases, however, individual jurists have followed the dictum of Just ice Gardiner in 
Ncoweni \'. Bezuidenhout, [1927] Cape Town Provincial Di\,. [C.P.D.] 130. "The rules of procedure of 
this court are devised for the purpose of administering justice and not of hampering it and where the 
rules are deficienl [ shall go as br as [ can in granting orders which would help to further the 
administration of justice." [d. 
\\.Then a principle important to the government is at issue, the government has been able to undercut 
court decisions favoring the individual. See notes 90,208 & 212 and accompanying text supra. Yet, the 
Nationalists still perceived judicial protection of individual rights as a threat to the Afrikaner social 
order. SPe Oggenblad, Jan. 21, 1980, reprinted in [1 980J S. AFR. DIG. 22, col. 3 (jan. 25, 1980). The paper 
asserted that lawyers who arcepljudgeships knowing that they have conscientious objections to existing 
legislation do the judicial system an injustice. Id. 
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